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Deste modo ou daquele modo.
Conforme calha ou não calha.
Podendo às vezes dizer o que penso,
E outras vezes dizendo-o mal e com misturas,
Vou escrevendo os meus versos sem querer,
Como se escrever não fosse uma cousa feita de gestos,
Como se escrever fosse uma cousa que me acontecesse
Como dar-me o sol de fora.
Procuro dizer o que sinto
Sem pensar em que o sinto.
Procuro encostar as palavras à idéia
E não precisar dum corredor
Do pensamento para as palavras
Nem sempre consigo sentir o que sei que devo sentir.
O meu pensamento só muito devagar atravessa o rio a nado
Porque lhe pesa o fato que os homens o fizeram usar.
Procuro despir-me do que aprendi,
i
Procuro esquecer-me do modo de lembrar que me ensinaram,
E raspar a tinta com que me pintaram os sentidos,
Desencaixotar as minhas emoções verdadeiras,
Desembrulhar-me e ser eu, não Alberto Caeiro,
Mas um animal humano que a Natureza produziu.
E assim escrevo, querendo sentir a Natureza, nem sequer como um homem,
Mas como quem sente a Natureza, e mais nada.
E assim escrevo, ora bem ora mal,
Ora acertando com o que quero dizer ora errando,
Caindo aqui, levantando-me acolá,
Mas indo sempre no meu caminho como um cego teimoso.
Ainda assim, sou alguém.
Sou o Descobridor da Natureza.
Sou o Argonauta das sensações verdadeiras.
Trago ao Universo um novo Universo
Porque trago ao Universo ele-próprio.
Isto sinto e isto escrevo
Perfeitamente sabedor e sem que não veja
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Que são cinco horas do amanhecer
E que o sol, que ainda não mostrou a cabeça
Por cima do muro do horizonte.
Ainda assim já se lhe vêem as pontas dos dedos
Agarrando o cimo do muro
Do horizonte cheio de montes baixos.
Alberto Caeiro
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À memória da minha mãe, Margarida.
À memória do meu irmão, Eduardo.
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Resumo
Esta tese pretende ser uma contribuição para o corpo de investigação em torno da utiliza-
ção da metodologia das opções reais a projectos de construção e a projectos de construção-
exploração. Pese embora estes projectos possuam uma natureza distinta da maioria dos
restantes projectos de investimento, consideramos que comungam das características da irre-
versibilidade, incerteza e flexibilidade.
Nos Capítulos II e III, propomos dois modelos teóricos de apoio à decisão que podem ser
utilizados por gestores de empresas dedicadas à realização de projectos de construção ad-
judicados através de um procedimento concursal competitivo. No Capítulo II, sugerimos
um modelo que permite determinar o preço óptimo para a realização do projecto, baseado
na avaliação de uma opção real por nós identificada e que apenas pode ser exercida pela
empresa vencedora do concurso. No Capítulo III, estudamos os efeitos produzidos por um
conceito específico de incerteza que rodeia os projectos de construção, e que designamos por
“incerteza de volume”. Com base na solução numérica apresentada no Capítulo II, propomos
um modelo que permite determinar o impacto esperado que este tipo de incerteza produz
no preço óptimo, através da definição de uma variável estocástica designada por “valor adi-
cional”, i.e., o lucro que poderá ser gerado considerando os efeitos da incerteza referida. O
modelo determina uma regra de apoio à decisão da realização de investimento de carácter
incremental em capital humano e tecnologia, o qual permite quantificar o impacto esperado
que a incerteza de volume causará no valor do projecto.
No Capítulo IV, no âmbito de um projecto de construção-exploração, propomos um modelo
teórico, baseado na existência de duas variáveis estocásticas, cuja finalidade consiste em
determinar o valor óptimo para a penalidade legal a incluir pelo governo ou outras entidades
públicas na minuta do respectivo contrato, no caso de a empresa concessionária não iniciar
a execução do projecto imediatamente. O modelo contempla a existência de custos sociais
e considera que a entidade privada é mais eficiente do que a entidade pública a construir a
infraestrutura do projecto.
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Abstract
The present thesis aims to contribute to the existent body of research dedicated to the use of
the real options approach in construction projects and Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) projects.
Even though these type of projects have a different nature than the majority of the other
investment projects, we believe that they share the same characteristics of irreversibility, un-
certainty and flexibility.
In Chapters II e III, we suggest two theoretical support decision models that may be applied
by construction managers in the context of bidding competitions. In Chapter II, we pro-
pose a model whose outcome is the optimal price for the execution of a construction project
awarded through an appropriate bidding process. The model is based on the valuation of a
specific real option, previously identified, and which can only be exercised by the selected
bidder. In Chapter III, we study the effects of a particular type of uncertainty that surrounds
construction projects, and which we designate as “volume uncertainty”. Applying the nu-
merical solution presented in the previous Chapter, we suggest a model that addresses the
expected impact of this type of uncertainty on the project value and on the optimal bid price,
through the definition of a stochastic variable, designated as “additional value”, i.e., the profit
that may be generated through the execution of additional work. The model’s outcome is the
threshold value for the incremental investment in human capital and technology construction
managers may undertake with the purpose of quantifying the expected impact that this type
of uncertainty will produce on the project value.
In Chapter IV, we suggest a theoretical model to be applied by governments and other public
entities, in the context of Build-Own-Transfer projects, based on a two-factor uncertainty
approach in continuous-time, aiming to determine the optimal value for the legal penalty
to be included in the contract form, in the case the selected bidder does not implement the
project immediately. The model considers the existence of social costs and assumes that the
private entity is more efficient than the public entity in executing the project facility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Uncertainty is a quality to be cherished, therefore - if not for it,
who would dare to undertake anything?”
Auguste de Villiers de L’Isle-Adam
1
In the last decade, the real options approach has been increasingly adopted to address
research topics concerning construction projects and Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) projects.
The interest in applying the real options approach to address issues involving these types of
projects is justified by the existence of high levels of uncertainty, the presence of flexibil-
ity and also recognizing that the investment costs are seldom reversible, which means that
construction costs are “project-specific”.
The present thesis comprises three theoretical models where the real options approach is ap-
plied to address three different research subjects. The first two models, proposed in Chapters
II and III, deal with topics concerning construction projects awarded through appropriate
bidding competition processes. The two models are, therefore, support decision models in-
tended to be used by construction managers. The third model, suggested in Chapter IV, is
to be applied by governments and other public entities, in the context of a BOT project, or
any other contractual arrangement between a public entity and a private firm, whereby the
public entity grants the construction of a facility and the operation of subsequent activities to
a private entity, rather than conducting the project itself.
In Chapters II and III, the models therein suggested address practical issues construction
managers have to deal during the bid preparation stage. Both models are, thus, based on the
existence of a bidding competition process and may be applied either when the process is
conducted by a public entity or by a private client, provided that the latter applies similar
rules and procedures to those used in public contracting processes.
The model proposed in Chapter II aims to reach the optimal price that construction managers
should include in their bid proposals. The model is based on the valuation of a specific real
option previously identified: the option to sign the contract and invest in executing the project
by the selected bidder. This implies that the selected bidder has flexibility regarding the
decision of whether to sign the contract and, consequently, invest in performing the project.
This flexibility does have value, as clearly stated by the option pricing theory. In fact, the
construction company (or “contractor”) selected by the client may decide not to sign the
contract and, hence, not exercise the option to invest, at the moment the contract has to be
signed. This decision may be justified by the fact that the expected amount of construction
costs, which served as the basis to establish the bid price, have most likely varied from the
moment the price was defined, the bid proposal delivered to the client and the day the bid
results become publicly available, one of the bidders selected and invited to sign the contract.
This period of time tends to be fairly long, especially in the case of large-scale projects
(such as airports, high-speed railway transportation, hospitals and highways) and when a
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substantial number of contractors compete to win the contract. Since the bid price remains
unchanged during this period, the project’s expected value is probably different than the
project value estimated during the bid preparation stage. In fact, the expected profit margin
(or, as commonly known in construction parlance, the “mark-up bid”) may now be negative.
Being so, and in pure financial terms, the selected bidder should decline the invitation to sign
the contract. On the contrary, if the price is higher than the expected construction costs, in the
day the contract has to be signed, then the selected bidder should exercise the option to invest
and sign the contract. The model is extended to accommodate the existence of penalty costs
since, in some legal environments, a financial compensation may be enforced if the selected
bidder refuses to enter into contract. These costs may also assume the nature of reputational
costs, i.e., costs that may be borne by the contractor in future bidding competitions as a result
of declining the present invitation. Considering these new conditions, the selected bidder
should only sign the contract and perform the project if the value of the penalty costs is
greater than the difference between the price and the expected amount of construction costs,
in the day the contract has to be signed.
The option identified above is only available to selected bidders, as we have mentioned. This
means that, when the bid price needs to be established, i.e., at the bid preparation stage, the
contractor does not know if he or she is going to be selected and invited to sign the contract.
In fact, a bid competition takes place and - all else equal - the project will be awarded to the
contractor that presented the lowest price or, which is the same, the lowest bid. Hence, the
value of the option to invest must be weighted by the probability of winning the bid. The
relationship between the price (or mark-up bid) and the probability of winning the contract
has been a subject of research since Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967) proposed the first
two models linking these two variables. The winning function suggested in Chapter II is a
two-parameter equation that respects the generally accepted inverse relationship between the
mark-up bid and the probability of winning the contract. This inverse relationship between
the price and the probability of winning the bid is an accepted fact both in the construction
industry and in the research community. Thus, the model integrates two different compo-
nents: (i) the value of the option to invest, before considering the impact of the probability
of winning the bid and (ii) the probability of winning the bid. However, variations in the bid
price will cause opposite effects in each of them. The value of the option to invest - before
being weighted by the probability of winning the bid - increases in response to higher bid
prices, whereas the probability of winning the contract decreases. Hence, the model’s out-
come is the result of a maximization problem, which integrates these two components and
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determines that, to the highest value of the option to invest, weighted by the probability of
winning the contract, corresponds a specific price. Under the real options approach and con-
sidering the characteristics of the option we have identified, this price is the optimal price,
and to this price corresponds the optimal mark-up bid.
In Chapter III, we turn our attention to a specific source of uncertainty surrounding construc-
tion projects, which we designate as “volume uncertainty”. Volume uncertainty is present in
many construction projects since contractors do not know, during the bid preparation stage,
the exact amount of work that will be executed during the construction phase. Indeed, this
type of uncertainty derives from the fact that value is often hidden in the most uncertain por-
tions of the project, as Ford et al. (2002) stated. These authors used the expression “hidden-
value” to designate the value that does not exclusively result from the execution of the tasks
included in the bid documents and according to the conditions therein established. Even
though we acknowledge that not all hidden-value results in the execution of more volume of
work, we use this expression to designate the value that is hidden and, if properly captured
and quantified, may lead to the creation of additional profit through the execution of addi-
tional orders, to be placed by the client after the bidding process has ended. Thus, we may
conclude that the presence of uncertainty surrounding the volume of work that will actually
be executed leads to uncertainty concerning the project value. In order to assess the impact
that volume uncertainty may cause on the project’s expected value, the model integrates a
discrete-time stochastic variable, designated as “additional value”. This stochastic variable
represents the additional profit that may be generated through the execution of more volume
of work. We assume that contractors, using the skills of their own experienced staff, are
able to stipulate a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate and to attribute a probability
of occurrence to each of the estimates just by undertaking a preliminary analysis of the bid
documents, which means that it is possible to define the statistical distribution for the values
this variable may assume without the need of incurring in any incremental investment. How-
ever, in order to determine the amount of additional value, contractors often need to invest
in human capital and technology and, hence, hire specialized firms and highly skilled profes-
sionals. This incremental investment needs to be undertaken for determining which of the two
estimates - the high-value estimate or the low-value - is, in fact, the true value. The model’s
outcome is the threshold value for the incremental investment that resolves the uncertainty
involving which of the two estimates previously defined is, in fact, the true value for the addi-
tional profit. A decision rule is reached: contractors should invest in hiring external services
with the purpose of determining the additional value to be generated through the execution
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of additional orders, placed by the client after the contract has been signed, provided that
the cost of this incremental investment does not exceed the predetermined threshold value.
By applying the maximization procedure suggested in Chapter II, the model also determines
the optimal price that results from considering the effect of the expected additional profit, if
no incremental investment is undertaken, and the optimal price in the case the incremental
investment reveals that the true value for the additional profit is equal to the high-estimate or
equal to the low-estimate, both previously defined.
The theoretical model proposed in Chapter IV is intended to be applied by governments and
other public entities, in the context of BOT projects. We propose a contractual framework
where the public entity does not impose any obligation to the the selected bidder concerning
the timing to initiate the project implementation. However, this flexibility may entail a cost
to the selected private firm and we suggest that this cost assumes the form of a legal penalty,
which should be written down in the contract form and enforced in the case the selected
bidder does not implement the project immediately. The model’s outcome is the optimal
value for this contractual penalty.
The method applied for determining the optimal value for the contractual penalty is based on
a two-factor uncertainty approach, where both the facility construction costs and the present
value of the cash flows to be generated by running the subsequent operations behave stochas-
tically, according to geometric Brownian motions that are possibly correlated. The model
considers the existence of social costs, which we define as the costs that correspond to the
loss of social welfare occurring from the moment the project should have been implemented
and services provided to the population and the moment the project is actually completed
and services start being provided to the users. The model also considers the generally ac-
cepted argument in the literature that the private entity is more efficient than the government
in constructing the project facility.
The method used comprises three different stages. First, the government decision to invest, as
if the project was undertaken by the government is derived, taking into account that the gov-
ernment decision to invest is a function of the level of social costs the government estimates
as being acceptable. Secondly, the government expectation about the private firm decision to
invest, assuming that the government considers the private firm to be more efficient in con-
structing the facility, is derived. Since this decision is also affected by the existence of a legal
penalty, we can not invoke homogeneity of degree one in the corresponding boundary con-
ditions, which means that we can not apply the closed form solution proposed by McDonald
and Siegel (1986). To overcome this problem, we follow Adkins and Paxson (2011) quasi-
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analytical approach, based on a set of three simultaneous equations. This set of equations
enables us to reach a discriminatory boundary for the private firm, separating the waiting re-
gion from the investment region. Finally, the same system of simultaneous equations is used
again in order to reach the optimal value for the contractual penalty. Since proportionality is
present between the value, in absolute terms, for the optimal contractual penalty and the ex-
pected construction costs, the model determines the optimal value for the contractual penalty
“per unit” of the private firm’s expected construction costs.
Sensitivity analysis performed demonstrates that there is a value for the comparative effi-
ciency factor above which there is no need to include a legal penalty in the contract, for a
given level of social costs. Similarly, there is a level of social costs, for a given level of com-
parative efficiency, above which enforcing a contractual penalty becomes justifiable, which
means that a trade-off exists between the two factors. We present the analytical solution that
determine each of the threshold values. We then proceed to examine the effects, to the gov-
ernment, that result from including a non-optimal value for the legal penalty in the contract
form. More specifically, we study the consequences of considering an inaccurate estimate
for the comparative efficiency factor, and conclude that overestimating (underestimating)
the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency leads to the inclusion of a below-optimal
(above-optimal) value for the legal penalty in the contract form. We conclude that enforcing
a non-optimal contractual penalty will produce effects that the government would prefer to
prevent.
The contribution we expect to give to the field of knowledge involving the application of the
real options approach to construction projects and BOT projects is manifold.
To the best of our knowledge, in Chapter II we propose the first model contributing to the
optimal mark-up bid debate applying the real options approach. By identifying and evaluating
the option to sign the contract and invest in performing the project, and considering that
the option can only be exercised by the selected bidder, we suggest a numerical solution,
consisting of a maximization problem, whose outcome is the optimal price contractors should
include in the bid proposals. We believe that, by identifying and evaluating this option and,
hence, recognizing the existence of flexibility to the selected bidder as of whether to sign
the contract and, consequently, to invest in performing the project, the model addresses the
optimal mark-up bid debate from an innovative perspective.
In Chapter III, our contribution is mainly focused in how we approach a specific type of
uncertainty surrounding construction projects and the method applied to assess the expected
impact that this specific type of uncertainty produces on the project value. We designate
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this type of uncertainty as “volume uncertainty”. Our contribution consists in evaluating
the impact of volume uncertainty on the project value, during the bid preparation stage, and
incorporate this impact on the decision making process regarding the definition of the price to
include in the bid proposal. A contribution is also given concerning the method used to assess
that same impact by including in the suggested model a discrete-time stochastic variable,
designated as “additional value”. The model’s outcome is a decision rule managers should
use regarding the amount of incremental investment in human capital and technology that
may be undertaken with the purpose of determining the true value for the expected additional
profit.
In Chapter IV, we propose the first model, addressing a research topic in the context of a BOT
project, based on a two-factor uncertainty approach in continuous-time. To the best of our
knowledge, the only research piece that assumes the two key-value drivers of a BOT project
as stochastic variables is the paper by Ho and Liu (2002). However, these authors address a
completely different research question and the model is based on a discrete-time framework.
The work included in Chapter IV also provides a contribution to the current body of research
by proposing an innovative contractual framework, in the context of BOT projects, whereby
the public entity grants leeway to the selected bidder regarding the timing for project im-
plementation, although a legal penalty may be enforced in the event the selected bider does
not implement the project immediately. The model’s outcome is the optimal value for this
contractual penalty. Another contribution to this field of knowledge is suggested by incor-
porating two factors in the model, which we believe have not been considered in previous
research pieces where the real options approach is used to address topics concerning BOT
projects: the existence of social costs and the generally accepted argument that the private
entity is more efficient than the government in executing the project facility.
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Chapter 2
Reaching an Optimal Mark-Up Bid
through the Valuation of the Option to
Sign the Contract by the Selected Bidder
2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, we aim to reach an optimal profit margin in the context of a bidding competi-
tion process applying the real options approach. The model herein suggested is a theoretical
model whose purpose is to optimize the contractor’s price through the valuation of the option
to sign the contract and invest in performing the project. When a contractor presents a bid
proposal to the client, and assuming that the probability of winning the bid is greater than
zero, the option to sign the contract and, subsequently, to invest in executing the project does
have value, as clearly established in the option pricing theory. The motivation behind the
present research is also supported by the presence of uncertainty since the estimated costs of
performing the project - the construction costs - will most likely vary from the moment the
bidder computes them and establishes the price to include in her or his bid proposal based
on such estimate, closes the proposal, delivers the proposal to the client, and the moment
the option is exercised or not, i.e., the moment the selected bidder is invited by the client to
sign the contract and decides to sign it or declines the invitation. In fact, and even though
the proposed bid price remains unchanged during this period, the uncertainty in construction
costs will most likely lead to changes in the project’s expected profit margin until the contract
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is eventually signed and the parties legally bounded.1
As far as the present research is concerned, contractors are firms operating in the construction
industry whose business consists in executing a set of tasks previously defined by the client.
The amount of tasks to be performed constitute a project, job or work. A significant amount
of projects in the construction industry are awarded through what is known as “tender” or
“bidding” processes (Christodoulou (2010); Drew et al. (2001)), being this the most popular
form of price determination (Liu and Ling (2005); Li and Love (1999)). A bidding process
consists of a number of contractors competing to perform a particular project by submitting
a sealed proposal until a certain date previously defined by the client. The usual format of a
bidding process is based on the rule that - all other things being equal - the contract will be
granted to the competitor that submitted the lowest bid (Cheung et al. (2008); Chapman et al.
(2000)), i.e., the lowest price. Bearing this in mind, it is easy to conclude that the client’s
decision is very straightforward but the contractor’s decision on what price to bid is more
difficult to reach, being probably one of the most difficult decisions construction managers
have to face during the bid preparation process (Li and Love (1999)).
The construction industry is known for featuring strong levels of price competitiveness (Chao
and Liu (2007); Mochtar and Arditi (2001); Ngai et al. (2002)) and the competitive pressures
are probably more intense than in any other industry (Drew and Skitmore (1997); Skitmore
(2002)). This fact often leads contractors to lower their profit margins in order to produce
a more competitive bid. Thus, it is not rare to see the winning bid include a near zero-
profit margin (Chao and Liu (2007)). Moreover, under-pricing in the context of competitive
bidding is a common phenomenon, namely explained by the need for work and penetration
strategies (Drew and Skitmore (1997); Fayek (1998); Yiu and Tam (2006)), even tough bid-
ding below-cost does not necessarily guarantee a successful result to the bidder (Tenah and
Coulter (1999)).2
Contractors recognize the existence of this fierce price competition and realize that bidding
low increases the chance of being selected to perform the project but they are also aware
of the opposite: if the price included in their proposal is higher, the probability of winning
the bid will definitively be lower. This inverse relationship between the level of the profit
margin (commonly known in the construction management literature as the “mark-up bid”)
1The risk that derives from the existence of uncertainty concerning the expected construction costs cannot
be hedged since the bid participants do not know how the bidding process will end.
2We believe that the expression “under-pricing” is used to reflect the inclusion of profit margins in the
bid price lower than the ones contractors would include if the price competition was not perceived as being
particularly intense. Hence, under-pricing is not necessarily the same as bidding below-cost.
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and the probability of winning the contract is an accepted fact both in the construction in-
dustry and within the research community (see, for example, Christodoulou (2010); Kim and
Reinschmidt (2006); Tenah and Coulter (1999); Wallwork (1999)).
Competitive bidding has been a subject of research since the important papers of Friedman
(1956) and Gates (1967) set the standards for future discussion. Both models proposed a
probabilistic approach to determine the most appropriate mark-up bid and were supported
by the existence of a relationship between the mark-up value and the probability of winning
the bid. For that purpose, the two authors assumed the existence of previous bidding data -
leading to the definition of the bidding patterns of potential competitors. Gates (1967) had the
merit to extend the model built by Friedman (1956) and turned it into a strategic model, with
general applicability, setting the foundations for what is now commonly known as “Tendering
Theory” (Runeson and Skitmore, 1999). Later attempts to establish a relationship between
the level of the profit margin and the probability of winning the bid were based on previous
bidding data – in line with the mentioned pioneer models. Carr (1982) proposed a model
similar to Friedman’s but differing in the partitioning of the underlying variables: Friedman
(1956) used a single independent variable, a composite “bid-to-cost” ratio, whereas Carr
(1982) crafted his model around two distributions: one that standardizes the estimated cost
of the analyzing bidder to that of all competitor bids, and another that standardizes the bids
of an individual competitor against that of the analyzing bidder’s estimated costs. More
recently, Skitmore and Pemberton (1994) presented a multivariate approach, assuming that
an individual bidder is not restricted to data for bids in which he or she has participated,
as in the case of Friedman (1956) and Gates (1967) models. Instead, the bidder is able to
incorporate data for all bidding competitions in which competitors and potential competitors
have participated, regardless of the individual bidder’s participation. This methodology had
the merit of increasing the amount of data available for estimating the model’s parameters.
An optimal mark-up value is then reached against known competitors, as well as other types
of strategic mark-ups.
Past research seems to suggest that it would be difficult to establish a link - with general
applicability - between the mark-up level and the probability of winning the bid. Contractors
may recur to previous bidding data and assume that bidders are likely to bid as they have
done in the past, in order to shape the relationship that best describes their specific situation.
However, as Fayek (1998) stated, past bidding information is not always available. To clearly
understand what researchers mean by “past bidding information”, we should distinguish be-
tween two different types of bidding data: (i) the one that is available to all contractors and
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comprises the estimates carried out by the client’s engineers for the execution of each task
or set of tasks, the price of each competitor for the execution of such task or set of tasks and
the final bid price of each competitor, i.e., the price of executing all the tasks defined by the
client; (ii) the real empirical data each contractor (eventually) compiles regarding the results
reached in past bidding competitions when a specific mark-up bid was included in the bid
price. The first type of data is publicly available and allows researchers to reach, through the
application of several models and methodologies, what are commonly known as “theoretical
probabilities”. These probabilities are determined based on data which is not real empirical
data. Real empirical data is private information that contractors seldom share, meaning that
this information is rarely observable and is, therefore, considered private knowledge of each
contractor.3 However, we recognize that assuming bidders are likely to bid as they have done
in the past becomes inevitable, regardless of the type of data in question. In fact, utilizing
past bidding information is only useful if one assumes that other bidders will decide in the
future in the same way they have decided in the past. Still, and even though we agree that
this assumption (which has been adopted since the pioneer works of Friedman (1956) and
Gates (1967)) may be considered somewhat restrictive, we sympathize with Crowley (2000)
when this researcher argued that bid models do not predict the future, but simply organize
past bidding information in a way that is meaningful to current bid decisions.4
Most of the more recent contributions to the optimal mark-up bid debate have been concerned
with the selection of factors construction managers should take into account when deciding
what price to bid (Christodoulou, 2010). Research by authors such as Drew and Skitmore
(1992), Shash (1993) and Drew et al. (2001) observed that different bidders apply different
mark-up policies, which may be variable or fixed. These authors list a long set of factors
aiming to explain the rationale behind mark-up bidding decision making: (1) amount of
work in hands; (2) number and size of bids in hands; (3) availability of staff, including
architects and other supervising officers; (4) profitability; (5) contract conditions; (6) site
conditions; (7) construction methods and programme; (8) market conditions and (9) identity
of other bidders, to name the ones they considered to be the most important. In general
terms, factors are grouped in different categories and we sympathize with the five categories
3Chapman et al. (2000) stated that many construction managers argue that collecting the necessary informa-
tion to apply quantitative models is too difficult, too expensive or even impossible - hence acknowledging the
fact that not all contractors compile data from previous bidding competitions.
4We believe that past bidding information is, in fact, the best tool construction managers may use to create
a perception as of how bidders will tend to act in the future. However, since each project has characteristics
that distinguishes it from all previous projects, we argue that construction managers should also consider the
specific features of the current bidding process when defining the mark-up bid.
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defined by Dulaimi and Shan (2002): (1) project characteristics; (2) project documentation;
(3) contractor characteristics; (4) bidding situation and (5) economic environment. Following
this line of thought, innovative research on the subject has been embracing more sophisticated
methodologies. The paper by Li and Love (1999) manages to combine rule-based expert
systems with Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) in the context of mark-up bid estimation,
following previous research conducted by Li (1996), Moselhi et al. (1991), amongst others. In
fact, the most recent and innovative models use ANN (as in Christodoulou (2010) and Liu and
Ling (2005)) or Goal Programming Technique (Tan et al. (2009)), where those determinants
(or attributes) provide the ground where models are built upon, thus recognizing the crucial
importance of possessing a strong knowledge of the factors influencing the contractors bid
mark-up decision for the purpose of establishing the optimal mark-up value (Dulaimi and
Shan (2002)).
Nevertheless, several studies suggest that decisions regarding the definition of the mark-up
bid are mainly supported using subjective judgment, gut feeling and heuristics (Hartono and
Yap, 2011), hence acknowledging the fact that, at least managers have a perception in real-
world situations as of how a specific mark-up level will affect the probability of winning the
current competition. In fact, we can not state that all construction managers support their
mark-up bid decisions using some kind of mathematical expression linking the profit margin
and the probability of winning the contract, but they are aware that higher mark-up values will
lead to lower chances of winning the project and do have a perception as of how their decision
regarding the definition of the mark-up bid will affect the probability of being selected to
perform the work. Bearing this in mind, we decided to propose a mathematical expression
linking the mark-up level with the probability of winning the bid that (i) respects the generally
accepted inverse relationship between these two variables; (ii) allows for flexibility and, thus,
may be adapted to accommodate the unique circumstances that surround a particular bidding
process.5 Moreover, the mathematical relationship that we suggest is very similar to the
one that results from the application of the Gates (1967) model included in Skitmore et al.
(2007) and, with a specific calibration, is almost graphically equal to the one these researchers
5Chapman et al. (2000) stated that, even though the probability of winning the bid may be difficult to deter-
mine, a relationship between the price and the probability of winning are implicit in any bidding process. These
authors also argue that, usually, the persons involved in the pricing decision have their own implicit version of
such relationship, which drives their decision making process. Chapman et al. (2000) stressed that making these
implicit perceptions explicit is an important part of arriving at an appropriate final bidding price. This line of
thought reinforces our argument that managers - at least - do have a perception as of how a specific price will
affect the probability of getting the contract and also underlines the importance of making explicit such implicit
perception.
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have reached.6 These authors used publicly available empirical data, which is included in a
previous study carried out by Schaffer and Micheau (1971).7 In their research piece, Skitmore
et al. (2007) applied three different methodologies: the Gates (1967) model, the exponential
model and the Weibull model.8 The mathematical relationship we suggest may be calibrated
to match the graphic representation of the results reached by using the Gates (1967) model
and, still, is sufficiently flexible to be adapted in order to explicitly shape the perception
construction managers have regarding the effect of the mark-up level in the probability of
winning the current contract.
Even though some work has been developed consisting in the application of the real options
approach to the construction management field (Espinoza (2011); Tseng et al. (2009); Yiu
and Tam (2006); Mattar and Cheah (2006); Ng and Bjornsson (2004); Ng and Chin (2004))
and, more specifically, aiming to evaluate a set of real options in the context of large-scale
investments (Pimentel et al. (2012); Couto et al. (2012)), there seems to be a lack of research
contributing to the optimal mark-up debate using this methodology, motivating us to build up
a model embracing the real options approach and aiming to reach the optimal mark-up bid.
This will be achieved by evaluating the option to sign the contract and invest in performing
the project and weighting the value of this option by the probability of winning the bid, since
the option can only be exercised by selected bidder. According to our model, construction
managers should establish a price which corresponds to the highest value of the option to
sign the contract, weighted by the probability of winning the bid. In financial terms and
under the real options approach, this is the right perspective to follow: to the highest value of
the option to invest - weighted by the probability of winning the contract - will correspond a
certain value for the profit margin, this being the optimal mark-up bid.
The remainder of this Chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 2.2, each of the model’s compo-
nents is described and the model’s numerical solution is proposed. In Section 2.3, a numerical
example is presented and a sensitivity analysis is performed to the option volatility level, its
’time to expiration’ and to the amount of the expected construction costs. We also assess
the impact of variations in each of the calibration parameters included in the proposed math-
6We propose an equation linking the mark-up level with the probability of winning the contract which com-
prises two parameters that should be calibrated with the purpose of accommodating contractor’s past bidding
data and their perception of how the mark-up decision affects the probability of winning the contract, consider-
ing the specific features of the current bidding process.
7The empirical data used comprised the estimates done by the client’s engineers in 50 bidding contracts and
the prices presented by each of the bid participants.
8These authors stressed that, for the Gates (1967) model to be considered valid in the context of their work,
they had to assume that bids can be described using the proportional hazard family of statistical distributions.
Please refer to Skitmore et al. (2007) for further details.
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ematical relationship between the mark-up bid and the probability of winning the contract
on the option value and on the optimal price. In Section 2.4, we consider the existence of
penalty costs if the selected bidder decides to decline the invitation to sign the contract and,
consequently, does not perform the project. We adapt the model accordingly and present the
new results based on the inputs of the numerical example presented in Section 2.3. Finally,
in Section 2.5, conclusions and remarks are given.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Introduction
Our model proposes a different approach regarding how the mark-up bid decision should be
made, recognizing the real options approach as an effective methodology in addressing the
optimal mark-up bid debate since the model herein presented (i) features uncertainty con-
cerning the behavior of the construction costs, from the moment the bid price is established
and the moment the client invites the selected bidder to sign the contract;9 (ii) considers flex-
ibility regarding the decision to sign the contract and invest in performing the project by the
selected bidder and (iii) recognizes that the investment expenditures are, at least, partially
irreversible as construction costs are project-specific. The three characteristics that the litera-
ture identifies as being essential for applying the real options approach to evaluate investment
decisions are, thus, present in the model we will describe.
2.2.2 Assumptions
We will assume that (i) each bidder decides what price to include in his or her proposal in
isolation; (ii) each bidder prepares his or her proposal simultaneously with the other com-
petitors; (iii) each bidder presents a single-sealed proposal to the client; (iv) each bidder has
access to the available information concerning the project in hands and all documentation to
support the cost estimation and the final bid decision, in line with all other potential bidders;
(v) the “bid package” also contains information about the date the bid results will be available
to all participants; (vi) it is possible to establish an inverse relationship between the mark-up
9Construction costs continue to behave stochastically after the selected bidder is invited to the sign the
contract. However, in the context of the real option we have identified - which expires in the moment the
selected bidder decides whether to sign the contract or not - such fact is not relevant.
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value and the probability of winning the bid; (vii) the selected bidder will only decide if he
or she is going to invest in executing the project at the moment the contract has to be signed
and not before that date.
Our model is thus based on the existence of a single-sealed bidding competition where inter-
action or contact of any kind with other bid participants is not considered. We will further
assume that bidders have no information about the number of competitors until the bid re-
sults are publicly available. We will first assume the absence of penalty costs in the case the
selected bidder decides not to sign the contract. Later on, in Section 2.4, we will consider
the presence of these costs, which may be of two different types: (i) financial costs, legally
enforced by the client and/or (ii) reputational costs, i.e., costs that may be borne by the con-
tractor in future bidding competitions as a result of declining the invitation to sign the present
contract.
2.2.3 Model Description
The model aims to determine the optimal mark-up bid to be included in the contractor’s
bidding price and depends upon two different components: (i) the value of the option to
sign the contract and invest in performing the project, which will be modeled as a contingent
claim, adapting the exchange option model proposed by Margrabe (1978); (ii) the probability
of winning the bid, since this option is only available to the selected bidder. Therefore, the
value of the option to sign the contract has to be weighted by the probability of winning the
contract.
As the option pricing theory establishes, there is a positive relationship between the price
included in the bid proposal and the value of the option to sign the contract and invest in
executing the project. In fact, the option value increases as the “underlying asset”, i.e., the
bid price increases. However, the higher the bid price the lower will be the probability of
winning the contract, as we previously mentioned. Thus, variations in the bid price will
produce opposite effects in the two components. Consequently, the optimal bid price will
be the solution of a maximization problem. We now proceed to present the two components
separately.
2.2.3.1 The Value of the Option to Sign the Contract and Perform the Project
The Margrabe (1978) exchange option model builds on the Black and Scholes (1973) for-
mula, used to evaluate a typical european call option and considers the existence of only
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one stochastic variable: the price of the “underlying asset”, whereas the Margrabe (1978)
model incorporates two “underlying assets”, being the model’s outcome the value of an eu-
ropean call option to exchange one asset for another. Let P denote the price included in the
bid proposal and K the expected amount for the construction costs computed during the bid
preparation stage. We adapt the Margrabe (1978) exchange option model to accommodate the
fact that only the exercise price is uncertain, i.e., the construction costs, K and also account-
ing for the fact that dP = 0, which means that the present value of P must be determined10.
K follows a stochastic process known as geometric Brownian motion, given by the following
equation:
dK = αKdt+σKdz (2.1)
where α is the drift parameter, dt is the time interval, σ is the standard deviation (volatility
parameter) and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. The Margrabe (1978)
formula (F) becomes:
F(P,K) = Pe−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2) (2.2)
being (d1) and (d2):
d1 =
ln(P/K)− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t (2.3)
d2 = d1− (σ
√
T − t) (2.4)
N(d1) and N(d2) are the probability density functions for the values resulting from expres-
sions (d1) and (d2), respectively. σ2 is the variance which, in our model, equals σ2K 11, r is
the risk-free interest rate and T−t is the time between the moment the bid price is established
and the moment the contract has to be signed.
10Taking into account the fact that the exercise price, i.e., the construction costs behave stochastically, we
could have evaluated this option as if it was a put option.
11σ2 = σ2P−2σPσKρPK +σ2K , where ρPK is the correlation coefficient between the price, P and the construc-
tion costs, K. Since P remains unchanged, then σ2P equals zero and so does 2σPσKρPK .
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2.2.3.2 The Probability of Winning the Bid
Based on our previous considerations, we propose an inverse relationship linking the mark-up
ratio, (P/K) and the probability of winning the bid, W (P,K), which is given by the following
equation:
W (P,K) = e−b(P/K)
n
(2.5)
where ’n’ and ’b’ are parameters that should be used to calibrate the expression linking the
mark-up ratio and the probability of winning the contract in order to best reflect each con-
tractor specific circumstances, as we previously argued. We will show how each of these
parameters affect the graphical representation of equation (2.5).
Parameter ’n’
Parameter ’n’ is responsible for shaping the graphical configuration of equation (2.5) in terms
of its concavity and convexity. Assuming parameter ’b’ equals ln(1/0.5), Figure 2.1 illus-
trates the impact caused on the configuration of equation (2.5) by five different values for
parameter ’n’.
Figure 2.1: representation of the equation linking the mark-up ratio with the probability of
winning the bid, considering five different values for parameter ’n’
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n = 5
n = 1
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Figure 2.1 shows that the curve becomes more pronounced as parameter ’n’ assumes higher
values. In its concave region, higher mark-up ratios cause increasing variations in the prob-
ability of winning the contract whereas, in the convex region, higher mark-up ratios lead to
decreasing variations in the probability of winning the bid. This effect assumes more impor-
tance as the curve stretches out in response to greater values assumed by parameter ’n’. For
lower values of ’n’, the relationship between the mark-up ratio and the probability of win-
ning the bid becomes almost linear. In fact, the function shrunks towards the center, gradually
showing both weaker concavity and convexity and, thus, traducing lower sensitivity to varia-
tions in the mark-up ratio. In real-world situations, managers should calibrate this parameter
and establish the existence and the pace at which this effect takes place.
Parameter ’b’
Assuming parameter ’n’ equals 10, Figure 2.2 shows the impact on the configuration of equa-
tion (2.5), resulting from considering five different values for parameter ’b’.
Figure 2.2: representation of the equation linking the mark-up ratio with the probability of
winning the bid, considering five different values for parameter ’b’
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This parameter enables contractors to calibrate the functional relationship between the mark-
up ratio and and the probability of winning the contract, given by equation (2.5), by setting
the probability of winning the bid when the price includes a zero-profit margin (i.e., when
the mark-up ratio equals 1). Figure 2.2 shows that, the greater the probability of winning the
contract considering a zero-profit margin (the configuration is presented for 10%, 30%, 50%,
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70% and 90% probability of winning the bid with a zero-profit margin), the more shifted up
and to the right the curve becomes. Thus, the greater the probability of winning the contract
with a mark-up bid equal to 1, the less prominent the convex region is, thus reflecting that
variations in the mark-up ratio for values situated in this area will cause smaller decreasing
impacts on the probability of winning the bid; on the other hand, the concave region becomes
more prominent and variations in the mark-up ratio located in this area will lead to greater
increasing variations in the probability of winning the contract.12
2.2.3.3 The Optimal Price
The optimal price will be the one that maximizes the value of the option to sign the contract
and invest in performing the project weighted by the probability of winning the bid. Thus,
the model’s outcome is the solution for the following maximization problem:
V (P,K) = max
P
{
[Pe−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2)][e−b(P/K)n]
}
(2.6)
Therefore, to the highest value of the option weighted by the probability of winning the bid
will correspond a specific price, P and, therefore, a specific mark-up value, M = P−K and
the corresponding mark-up ratio, P/K. This will be the optimal price, P∗, the optimal margin,
M∗ = P∗−K and the optimal mark-up ratio P∗/K, as we illustrate in the following numerical
example.
2.3 Numerical Example
2.3.1 The Base Case
Table 2.1 includes information about the inputs used in our numerical example.
12If we calibrate equation (2.5) with parameter ’b’ approximately equal to ln(1/0.225) and parameter ’n’
equal to 12, and also consider that the mark-up ratio ranges from 0.75 to 1.15, the graphical representation of
equation (2.5) almost matches the one Skitmore et al. (2007) reached by applying the Gates (1967) model.
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Table 2.1: inputs: description and values
input description value
K construction costs C 50,000,000
σ standard deviation 25%
r risk-free interest rate 1%
T − t time from the moment the price is established until the contract is awarded 0.5 (years)
n parameter for calibrating the relationship between P/K and W 10
b parameter for calibrating the relationship between P/K and W ln(1/0.5)
Considering the values included in Table 2.1, the relationship between the mark-up ratio and
the probability of winning the bid will be given by the following equation:
W (P,K) = e−ln(1/0.5)(P/K)
10
(2.7)
Hence, we are considering that there is a 50% probability of winning the bid if the contractor
establishes a zero-profit margin, i.e., P/K = 1, and also that parameter ’n’= 10. Figure 2.3
shows the configuration that results from this specific calibration, considering that the mark-
up ratio ranges from 0.8 to 1.2.
Figure 2.3: graphical representation of the equation linking the mark-up ratio with the prob-
ability of winning the bid, considering that parameter ’b’ equals ln(1/0.5) and parameter ’n’
equals 10
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This inverted S-shaped curve respects the generally accepted inverse relationship between the
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mark-up ratio and the probability of winning the bid and typically comprises two regions: a
concave region and a convex region. In its concave region, variations in the mark-up ratio
lead to increasing variations in the probability of winning the contract whereas, in the con-
vex region, variations in the mark-up ratio cause decreasing variations in the probability of
winning the bid. Table 2.2 includes a set of representative values for both variables, applying
equation (2.7):
Table 2.2: representative values for the mark-up ratio and the probability of winning the bid
(for: b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10)
P/K 0.800 0.850 0.900 0.950 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200
W 92.8% 87.2% 78.5% 66.0% 50.0% 32.3% 16.6% 0.61% 0.14%
Table 2.3 includes the results reached considering a set of different prices, P, the correspond-
ing mark-up values, M and mark-up ratios, P/K.
Table 2.3: different results for the option value, considering different price levels
(for: K = C 50,000,000; b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10; σ = 0.25; r =0.01; T − t = 0.5 years)
P (C) P/K M(P,K) (C) F(P,K) (C) W (P,K) V (P,K) (C)
40,000,000 0.8000 -10,000,000 365,301 92.83% 339,109
45,000,000 0.9000 -5,000,000 1,353,040 78.53% 1,062,542
50,000,000 1.0000 0,000,000 3,389,530 50.00% 1,694,765
50,420,898 1.0084 420,898 3,612,312 47.05% 1,700,224
55,000,000 1.1000 5,000,000 6,520,306 16.57% 1,080,415
60,000,000 1.2000 10,000,000 10,498,738 1.37% 143,833
The results included in Table 2.3 demonstrate that, the higher the value of the “underlying
asset”, the higher the value of F(P,K) (the value of the option to sign the contract increases
in response to the presence of higher bid prices) and the lower the value of W (P,K), since this
probability decreases as the bid price (or mark-up bid) assumes greater values. This combined
effect - reflecting opposite responses to variations in the bid price - makes V (P,K) increase
until its maximum value is reached: C 1,700,224. To this maximum value of the option to
invest weighted by the probability of winning the bid, V (P,K) corresponds the optimal mark-
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up value, M∗= C 420,898 and the optimal mark-up ratio, P/K∗ = 1.0084. Thus, the optimal
price is P∗= C 50,420,898.
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between the price, P and the option value, V (P,K), consid-
ering the inputs included in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.4: relationship between the price and the option value
P* = $ 50, 420, 898
MAX. V(P,K)  =   $ 1,700,224  
3´ 107 4´ 107 5´ 107 6´ 107 7´ 107
0
500 000
1.0´ 106
1.5´ 106
Figure 2.4 illustrates the maximization problem given by equation (2.6). The function in-
creases until it reaches the maximum value for the option to invest, i.e., V (P,K)= C 1,700,224,
to which corresponds the optimal price, P∗ =C 50,420,898. From this price onwards, the op-
tion value, V (P,K) decreases and tends to zero, as the price tends to infinity.
2.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We first perform a sensitivity analysis to two of the parameters that influence the value of the
option before being weighted, F(P,K) - the volatility parameter and the ’time to expiration’
parameter - with the purpose of assessing the impact of three different values for each of
them on the option value, V (P,K) and on the optimal price, P∗. We also perform a sensitivity
analysis to the expected amount of direct costs of executing the project, in order to verify if
a scale-effect is present in the model. Finally, we present the results of the impact caused
by considering different values for each of the parameters included in equation (2.5), i.e.,
parameter ’b’ and parameter ’n’, on the option value, V (P,K) and on the optimal price, P∗.
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2.3.2.1 Volatility
Table 2.4 presents the impact of different volatility levels, σ on the option value, V (P,K) and
on the optimal price, P∗.
Table 2.4: sensitivity analysis: volatility parameter
(for: K = C 50,000,000; b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10; r = 0.01;T − t = 0.5 years)
Volatility (σ) Option Value V (P,K) (C) Optimal Price (P∗) (C)
0.15 1,123,521 52,145,144
0.175 1,248,923 51,672,800
0.2 1,388,233 51,226,901
0.225 1,539,224 50,809,755
0.25 1,700,224 50,420,898
0.275 1,869,923 50,058,683
0.2792 1,899,209 50,000,000
0.3 2,047,272 49,721,038
0.325 2,231,402 49,405,824
0.35 2,421,585 49,110,994
The results included in Table 2.4 clearly reflect that, the higher the volatility level the higher
the maximum value of the option to invest, as the option pricing theory states. However, the
optimal price - the one which corresponds to the highest value of the option - decreases since
contractors will present a lower bid as a consequence of holding a more valuable option to
invest.
We should stress that, according to these results, contractors will establish a price equal to
the construction costs (i.e., a mark-up bid equal to 1) if the volatility associated with the
construction costs is 0.2792.
Figure 2.5 displays the different configurations that result from considering a set of three
different levels of volatility: σ = 0.2; σ = 0.25 and σ = 0.3.
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Figure 2.5: sensitivity analysis: volatility parameter
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2.3.2.2 ’Time to Expiration’
Table 2.5 presents the impact produced by considering three different values for the ’time to
expiration’ parameter (T − t) on the option value, V (P,K) and on the optimal price, P∗.
Table 2.5: sensitivity analysis: ’time to expiration’ parameter
(for: K = C 50,000,000; b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10; σ = 0.25; r = 0.01)
Time to Expiration, (T − t) (Years) Option Value, V (P,K) (C) Optimal Price, (P∗) (C)
0.50 1,700,224 50,420,898
0.75 2,058,702 49,660,977
1.00 2,379,473 49,105,003
The results included in Table 2.5 are consistent with the ones we have reached in the last
analysis: the longer the life of the option the greater the maximum value for the option to
invest (as established by the option pricing theory) and the lower the optimal price, as we
previously explained.
Figure 2.6 shows the different configurations that result from considering each of the values
for the ’time to expiration parameter’ included in Table 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: sensitivity analysis: ’time to expiration’ parameter
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2.3.2.3 Construction Costs
Table 2.6 includes the results of the impact caused by a set of values for the construction
costs, K on the option value, V (P,K), on the optimal price, P∗ and on the optimal mark-up
ratio, P∗/K.
Table 2.6: sensitivity analysis: construction costs
(for: b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10; σ = 0.25; r = 0.01; T − t = 0.5 years)
K (C) V (P,K) (C) P∗ (C) (P∗/K)
12,500,000 425,096 12,605,224 1.0084
25,000,000 850,112 25,210,449 1.0084
50,000,000 1,700,224 50,420,898 1.0084
75,000,000 2,550,336 75,631,346 1.0084
100,000,000 3,400,447 100,841,795 1.0084
125,000,000 4,250,559 126,052,245 1.0084
The results included in Table 2.6 demonstrate that no scale-effect is present. Regardless of
the level of construction costs, the optimal mark-up ratio remains unchanged, which means
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that the model’s outcome responds linearly to variations in the project dimension.
2.3.2.4 The Impact of Variations in Parameter ’b’ on the Option Value and on the
Optimal Price
Table 2.7 exhibits the results produced by considering a set of different values for parame-
ter ’b’ on the option value after being weighted by the probability of winning the contract,
V (P∗,K), on the probability of winning the bid, W (P∗,K) and, finally, on the optimal price,
P∗ and on the optimal mark-up ratio, P∗/K. We set parameter ’n’ to 10.
Table 2.7: the impact of variations in parameter ’b’ on the option value and on the optimal
price
(for: K = C 50,000,000; n = 10; σ = 0.25; r = 0.01; T − t = 0.5 years)
ln(1/0.3) ln(1/0.4) ln(1/0.5) ln(1/0.6) ln(1/0.7) ln(1/0.8) ln(1/0.9)
V (P∗,K) (C) 1,096,022 1,369,742 1,700,224 2,125,739 2,719,739 3,657,428 5,567,042
W (P∗,K) 43.27% 44.41% 47.05% 49.15% 51.60% 54.73% 59.51%
P∗(C) 48,219,507 49,297,530 50,420,898 51,675,187 53,187,382 55,224,015 58,643,159
P∗/K 0.9644 0.9860 1.0084 1.0335 1.0637 1.1045 1.1729
Not surprisingly, the results included in Table 2.7 demonstrate that the higher the probability
of winning the contract with a zero-profit margin (which is exactly what parameter ’b’ es-
tablishes) the higher the option value, V (P∗,K) and the higher the optimal price, P∗ and the
optimal mark-up ratio, P∗/K. Therefore, positive variations in this parameter produce pos-
itive variations in the option value before being weighted by the probability of winning the
bid (as a result of considering higher optimal bid prices), positive variations in the probability
of winning the contract and, hence, positive variations in the optimal price and in the optimal
mark-up ratio.
2.3.2.5 The Impact of Variations in Parameter ’n’ on the Option Value and on the
Optimal Price
Table 2.8 includes the results of considering several different values for parameter ’n’ and the
impact on the option value, V (P∗,K), on the optimal price, P∗ and on the optimal mark-up
ratio, P∗/K. The results that illustrate the impact on the value of the option before being
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weighted by the probability of winning the contract, F(P∗,K) and on the probability of win-
ning the bid, W (P∗,K) are also displayed.
Table 2.8: the impact of variations in parameter ’n’ on the option value and on the optimal
price
(for: K = C 50,000,000; b = ln(1/0.5); σ = 0.25; r = 0.01; T − t = 0.5 years)
1 5 10 15 20 30
F(P∗,K) (C) 71,775,662 6,991,910 3,613,654 2,957,695 2,750,190 2,652,675
W (P∗,K) 18.33% 30.63% 47.05% 58.61% 66.41% 75.90%
V (P∗,K) (C) 13,156,479 2,141,622 1,700,224 1,733,505 1,826,401 2,013,380
P∗(C) 122,385,365 55,642,728 50,420,898 49,139,865 48,700,195 48,486,755
P∗/K 2.4477 1.1129 1.0084 0.9828 0.9740 0.9697
The results included in Table 2.8 are not so straightforward to interpret as in the previous
case. The option value, V (P∗,K) decreases until parameter ’n’ attains a certain value and
increases from then onwards.13 In fact, for lower values of ’n’, the impact produced by
the optimal price, P∗ on the value of the option before being weighted by the probability
of winning the contract, F(P∗,K) is stronger than the impact of opposite nature that the
optimal price produces on the probability of winning the bid, W (P∗,K). Hence, the two
effects combined lead to a lower option value, V (P∗,K).14 For higher values of ’n’, the
opposite occurs: the impact that variations in this parameter produce on the probability of
winning the bid, W (P,K) is stronger than the impact produced on the value of the option
before being weighted, F(P∗,K), hence resulting in higher values for the option to invest,
V (P∗,K).
Thus, by confronting these results with the graphical representation of the impact caused by
different values for parameter ’n’ on the probability of winning the contract - the ones con-
sidered in Figure 2.1 - we conclude that including low values for this parameter in equation
(2.5) (’n’ = 1 and ’n’ = 5, in Figure 2.1) lead to an almost linear relationship between the
mark-up ratio and the probability of winning the bid. This means that the presence of low
levels for ’n’ result in a configuration to equation (2.5) where both concavity and convexity
regions are less pronounced and changes in this parameter (say, from n = 1 to n = 2) lead
13The option value, V (P∗,K) starts increasing for values of ’n’ approximately greater than 11.
14Please note that V (P∗,K) = F(P∗,K)∗W (P∗,K).
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to less strong positive variations in the probability of winning the bid, W (P∗,K) than the
stronger negative impact that results from considering lower optimal bid prices for the value
of the option before being weighted by the probability of winning the contract, F(P∗,K). On
the other hand, considering higher values for ’n’ leads equation (2.5) to show both greater
concavity and convexity. Hence, when ’n’ assumes higher values, changes in this parameter
(say, from ’n’ = 15 to ’n’ = 30) lead to a higher impact on the probability of winning the bid,
W (P∗,K) than on the value of the option before being weighted, F(P∗,K) since, as we have
observed, variations in the optimal mark-up ratio situated in the curve’s concave (convex)
region will produce more (less) than proportional variations in the probability of winning the
contract. This implies that, when we consider higher values for parameter ’n’, the impact
produced by variations in this parameter on the probability of winning the bid is stronger
than the impact caused on the value of the option before being weighted, F(P∗,K), hence
resulting in greater levels for the option value, V (P∗,K).
Thus, we conclude that the option value, V (P∗,K) and the optimal price, P∗ are highly sensi-
tive to changes in parameter ’n’ when it assumes very low levels, i.e., when the relationship
between the mark-up ratio and the probability of winning the bid, given by equation (2.5),
becomes closer to a linear relationship. However, as ’n’ assumes higher levels (15, 20, and
30, in our example), the impact of variations in this parameter is much less strong. In fact,
the negative variations observed in the optimal price in response to higher values of ’n’ are
not substantial, as the results included in Table 2.8 clearly reflect.
2.4 Considering the Existence of Penalty Costs
In the previous Sections we have not considered the existence of penalty costs, which means
that we have been assuming that the selected bidder will not bear any type of costs if he or
she decides to decline the invitation to sign the contract. Yet, in some legal environments, the
selected contractor may have to pay a legal compensation if the option to sign the contract
is not exercised. According to Halpin and Senior (2011), in the United States contractors
are free to withdraw their bids without incurring in any penalties if that happens prior to the
ending of the bidding period. However, if a contractor decides to withdraw the bid after that
moment - and assuming that he or she is the selected bidder - a penalty equal to the difference
between the second best proposal and the selected bid is legally imposed, even if the contract
has not yet been signed. According to Halpin and Senior (2011), “this may occur in the event
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that the selected bidder realizes that he or she has underbid the project and that pursuing the
work will result in a financial loss” (p.44).15 In these circumstances, the client may exercise
the legal right of receiving the difference between the two bid prices.
For the sake of convenience but also because - from the contractor’s perspective - the expected
penalty costs can be seen as a percentage of the construction costs, we will assume that g, the
amount of the penalty costs, is estimated as being a percentage of K, the construction costs.16
Thus, the payoff (at maturity) of the option to sign the contract, under these new conditions,
will be:
Max[P−KT ;−gKT ] (2.8)
Expression (2.8) entails that the contractor will chose to pay the legal penalty, “gKT ” if this
cost is smaller than the financial loss given by the difference between P and KT , i.e., the
expected profit the project will generate, at the moment the contract needs to be signed, T .
On the contrary, if this difference is smaller than the amount of the legal compensation, gKT ,
than the contractor will prefer to sign the contract and execute the job. Considering these new
conditions, we again adapted the Margrabe (1978) formula. Equation (2.9) below includes
two important changes when compared with equation (2.2):
1) The exercise price is now equal to “(1−g)K”. The explanation resides in the fact that, if
the contract is signed and the project performed, the contractor will invest the amount “K”.
On the contrary, if the contractor declines the invitation to sign the contract, he or she incurs
in a penalty cost equal to the amount “gK”. Thus, seen in incremental terms, "(1− g)K"
becomes the exercise price if the contractor exercises the option to perform the project in the
presence of these costs.
2) N(d2) is the risk-neutral probability that the option will be exercised at maturity (Nielsen,
1992) in the original Black and Scholes (1973) formula or, in other words, the probability
that the option will finish “in-the-money” in a risk-neutral world (Smith, 1976). This also
holds the same meaning in the Margrabe (1978) model. Hence, [1−N(d2)] expresses the
probability that the option will not be exercised at the maturity since it will not finish “in-the-
money”. In these circumstances, the contractor will prefer to support the penalty costs, “gK“
and not sign the contract. Let Pg denote the bid price in the presence of penalty costs. The
adapted version of Margrabe (1978) formula, Fg(Pg,K) becomes:
15We believe the authors use the word “underbid” to express the fact that the selected bidder may realize, in
the day the contract has to be signed, that the expected construction costs are greater than the bid price.
16As we previously mentioned, penalty costs may also assume the nature of reputational costs.
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Fg(Pg,K) = [Pge−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2)−gK(1−N(d2))] (2.9)
where:
d1 =
ln[Pg/(1−g)K)]− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t (2.10)
and
d2 = d1− (σ
√
T − t) (2.11)
N(d1) and N(d2) are the probability density functions for the values resulting from expres-
sions (d1) and (d2), respectively. σ2 is the variance17 and T−t is the time between the
moment the bid price is established and the moment the contract has to be signed.
Equation (2.5) still holds. Hence, under these new conditions, the model’s outcome is the
solution for the following maximization problem:
Vg(Pg,K) = max
Pg
{
[Pge−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2)−gK(1−N(d2))][e−b(Pg/K)n ]
}
(2.12)
Using the same inputs considered in Table 2.1, Table 2.9 includes the results for Fg(Pg,K),
W (Pg,K) and Vg(Pg,K) considering a set of different prices, Pg, the corresponding mark-up
values, Mg and mark-up ratios, Pg/K , and assuming that the penalty costs, g equal 2% of the
construction costs.
17As in the case where penalty costs were not considered, σ2 equals σ2K .
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Table 2.9: the impact of different prices on the option value and on the probability of winning
the bid, in the presence of penalty costs
(for: K = C 50,000,000; b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10; σ = 0.25; r = 0.01; T − t = 0.5 years; g = 0.02)
Pg (C) Pg/K Mg(Pg,K) (C) Fg(Pg,K) (C) W (Pg,K) Vg(Pg,K) (C)
40,000,000 0.800 -10,000,000 -329,395 92.83% -305,777
45,000,000 0.900 -5,000,000 847,793 78.53% 665,772
50,000,000 1.000 0,000,000 3,112,681 50.00% 1,556,341
50,971,124 1.019 971,124 3,937,479 43.16% 1,589,381
55,000,000 1.100 5,000,000 6,439,134 16.57% 1,066,965
60,000,000 1.200 10,000,000 10,547,559 1.37% 144,502
The value of the option to sign the contract, Vg(P,K) assumes negative values for low levels
of Pg, in line with the interpretation of expression (2.8). The option value, Vg(Pg,K) be-
comes positive for price levels above C 41,882,195 and reaches its maximum value when
Vg(Pg,K) =C 1,589,381, to which corresponds a price, Pg = C 50,971,124. This is the
optimal price, P∗g in the presence of penalty costs, a slightly higher value than when penalty
costs were not considered. Figure 2.7 illustrates the relationship between the price, Pg and
the option value, Vg(Pg,K) for an estimated level of penalty costs, g = 0.02.
Figure 2.7: relationship between the price and the option value, considering the existence of
penalty costs
P = $ 41,882,195
P* = $ 50,971,124
MAX. V = $ 1,589,381
3´ 107 4´ 107 5´ 107 6´ 107 7´ 107
-500 000
0
500 000
1.0´ 106
1.5´ 106
Figure 2.8 compares the relationship between the price, P and the value of the option to sign
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the contract, V (P,K) for both cases, i.e., considering the base case where g = 0 and the case
where penalty costs are considered and estimated to be g = 0.02.
Figure 2.8: relationship between the price and the option value, with and without the exis-
tence of penalty costs
No
Penalty
Costs
With
Penalty
Costs
3´ 107 4´ 107 5´ 107 6´ 107 7´ 107
-500 000
0
500 000
1.0´ 106
1.5´ 106
In the ascending part of the two curves, the option value is higher in the absence of penalty
costs for a specific price value. This difference becomes less important as the price increases,
until the maximum value for the option is reached, in both scenarios. In their descending
part, the curves feature very similar configurations, with the option value - in the presence
of penalty costs - reaching a slightly lower value for a specific price level, until both curves
converge when higher price levels are considered.
Table 2.10 includes the values for the optimal price, P∗g that result from considering a set of
three different levels of penalty costs, g = 0.02, g = 0.04 and g = 0.06 .
Table 2.10: the impact of different levels of penalty costs on the option value and on the
optimal price
(for: K = C 50,000,000; b = ln (1/0.5); n = 10; σ = 0.25; r = 0.01; T − t = 0.5 years)
g (%K) g (C) Vg(Pg,K) (C) P∗g (C)
2% 100,000 1,589,381 50,971,124
4% 200,000 1,512,369 51,368,786
6% 300,000 1,460,022 51,661,230
The results included in Table 2.10 reveal that the option value, Vg(Pg,K) decreases as the
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penalty costs, g assume greater levels, reflecting the fact that the option to invest is less
valuable when penalty costs are greater. The optimal price, P∗g increases when greater levels
of penalty costs are considered, which means that construction managers need to establish
higher bid prices in order to compensate for the growing impact produced by this type of
costs.
2.5 Conclusions and Remarks
The theoretical model herein presented aims to underline the importance of considering the
existence of uncertainty and the presence of flexibility, at the bid preparation stage. We have
identified and evaluated an option that is only available to the selected bidder - the option
to sign the contract and invest in executing the project. The selected bidder has flexibility
concerning the decision of whether to sign the contract and execute the project and, as clearly
stated in the option pricing theory, flexibility does have value. The option to sign the con-
tract and perform the project constitutes a real option and, when there are no penalty costs
involved, the option should only be exercised if the construction costs, at the time the con-
tract has to be signed, are lower than the price included in the bid proposal. However, when
penalty costs are present, the selected bidder should only exercise the option if the difference
between the bid price and the construction costs is greater than the penalty costs, in the day
the contract has to be signed.
A numerical solution, which consists of a maximization problem, is proposed. This solution
determines that - to the highest value of the option to execute the project weighted by the
probability of winning the contract - corresponds the optimal price. According to the ap-
proach adopted, to this optimal price corresponds the optimal mark-up bid contractors should
include in their proposals.
We performed a sensitivity analysis to three of the parameters that influence the value of the
option and also assessed the impact of variations in each of the calibration parameters in-
cluded in the suggested mathematical relationship between the price and the probability of
winning the bid. The results revealed that the maximum value of the option is higher and
the optimal bid price is smaller in response to positive variations in the volatility associated
with the construction costs, as well as to positive variations in the ’time to expiration’ param-
eter. The results also showed that the model’s outcome responds linearly to variations in the
amount of construction costs, which means that the optimal mark-up ratio remains unchanged
for any dimension the investment may assume.
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The sensitivity analysis performed to the calibration parameters revealed that the option value
and the optimal price are highly sensitive to variations in each of them. The impact produced
by considering higher values for parameter ’b’ on the optimal price is considerable, and
the higher the value assumed by this calibration parameter, the higher the option value and
the higher the optimal bid price. However, when we examined the impact of variations in
parameter, ’n’, we concluded that the value of the option to sign the contract and perform
the project decreases until a specific value assumed by this parameter, and increases from
then onwards. When very low values for parameter ’n’ are considered, the optimal price is
highly sensitive to variations in this parameter and is much less sensitive to variations when
’n’ assumes higher values. Therefore, construction managers should be aware of the high
sensitivity that the optimal bid price exhibits in response to variations in parameter ’n’ when
it assumes very low levels. In fact, for low levels of ’n’, any small variation will produce a
great impact on the optimal bid price.
Finally, based on the inputs considered in the numerical example, we concluded that, when
penalty costs are present, the optimal price is higher, corresponding to a lower maximum
value of the option to invest in performing the project, when compared with the optimal
price when penalty costs are absent. Furthermore, the optimal price increases in response to
positive variations in the level of the penalty costs, as higher expected values of penalty costs
lead construction managers to establish higher mark-up bids as a consequence of holding a
less valuable option to invest. This increase in the price is the compensation construction
managers demand for supporting the presence of greater levels of penalty costs.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Volume Uncertainty on the
Project Value and on the Optimal Bid
Price
3.1 Introduction
Uncertainty surrounding construction projects is a crucial element that should be adequately
managed since it may have a considerable impact on construction company’s overall perfor-
mance. Construction companies or contractors are firms operating in the construction indus-
try whose business resides in executing a set of tasks previously established by the client.1
The amount of tasks to be performed constitutes a project, job or work. The vast majority of
projects in the construction industry are assigned through what is known as “tender” or “bid-
ding” processes (Christodoulou (2010); Drew et al. (2001)), this being the most popular form
of price determination (Liu and Ling (2005); Li and Love (1999)). In a tender or bidding
process, a certain number of contractors (bidders) compete to execute a project by submit-
ting a single-sealed proposal until a specific date previously defined by the client. Potential
bidders have access to a what is commonly known as the “bid package”. This package con-
tains a set of technical pieces (often also referred as “tender documents”) which serve as the
basis for establishing the price to include in the bid proposal. More specifically, the package
includes plans and technical drawings, a proposal form, the “general conditions” covering
1For the purposes of this research, we exclude those situations where contractors execute their own projects,
as it is often the case of construction companies operating in the real estate sector.
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procedures which are common to all construction contracts and the “special conditions” con-
taining the procedures to be used and that are unique to the project in question (Halpin and
Senior (2011)), including information about the type of contract that will be enforced.
The usual format of a tender or bidding process is based on the rule that - all other things
being equal - the contract will be awarded to the competitor that submitted the lowest price
(Christodoulou (2010); Cheung et al. (2008); Chapman et al. (2000)) or, which is the same,
the lowest bid. Thus, the bidder that proposed the lowest price will most likely be invited
to sign the contract and, if the contract is actually signed, he or she will have to invest a
substantial amount of money by incurring in the necessary direct costs to execute the project,
i.e., the construction costs.
Traditionally, construction management literature has been placing more emphasis on the
negative effects of uncertainty, which means researchers seem to be more concerned with
ways to deal with the risks involving the construction activities and how they may affect the
value of the project through a negative impact on the construction costs. In fact, few authors
have been addressing uncertainty as a source of opportunity, as it is the case of Ford et al.
(2002), Ng and Bjornsson (2004) and Yiu and Tam (2006). Ford et al. (2002) argued that
construction projects may include specific sources of uncertainty that affect project value,
but not necessarily just by reducing it. This argument is supported by Ng and Bjornsson
(2004) when they state that, even though uncertainty can lead to cost over-runs and delays, it
can also produce positive return if properly managed. Following this line of thought, Yiu and
Tam (2006) applied the real options approach to evaluate the intrinsic value of uncertainty
and the managerial flexibility deriving from the options to defer and to switch modes of
construction. Therefore, uncertainty can also be seen as a source of opportunities, rather
than just an element that may cause undesirable effects during the construction stage - in
clear opposition to the traditional view that ”all uncertainty presumes loss” (Mak and Picken
(2000)).
Ford et al. (2002) acknowledge the fact that many construction project conditions evolve over
time and, thus, managerial choices for effective decision-making cannot be completely and
accurately determined during the pre-project planning period. In fact, these authors observe
that many aspects of construction projects are uncertain, such as input prices, the weather
conditions, the length of some activities and the overall duration of the project, among others,
meaning that the effects of some of these sources of uncertainty can only be recognized and
properly managed as the project unfolds. This argument is also supported by Mattar and
Cheah (2006) when they mention that contractors typically learn more about the value of the
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project as they invest over time and uncertainties are resolved.
Even though we recognize the fact that the possible consequences of some sources of uncer-
tainty cannot be anticipated, we do believe that others can be predicted and accounted for
during the bid preparation process. Moreover, we will try to demonstrate that it is possible to
establish a support decision model that accommodates the expected impact of a specific type
of uncertainty - the uncertainty associated with the amount of work to be executed during the
project’s life cycle - on the project value.
The model we propose in the present Chapter builds on this crucial aspect by focusing on
a specific source of uncertainty which may lead to a greater project value by increasing the
expected amount of work to be executed during the construction stage. This means we believe
that this source of uncertainty is - at least - as decisive as the others in adding value to the
project. Therefore, managers should recognize its importance by planning and strategically
managing this element in a way that improves the project value and, as we will demonstrate,
their competitiveness in a bidding competition context.
Despite the fact that project value can be substantially increased by reducing costs, we would
like to reinforce the idea that project value can also be increased by raising more income.
As we will see, more income means the income that is generated through actually executing,
during the construction phase, a certain amount of tasks which were not included in the tender
documents. We are thus concerned with the uncertainty that may lead to more project value
by increasing the amount of work to be performed by contractors, “vis-a-vis” with the amount
of work contractors are contractually bound to execute. We will refer to this type of value as
“hidden-value”.2
Hidden-value should be captured and quantified in the pre-project stage while the bid pro-
posal is being prepared, by carefully analyzing the portions of the project where it may be
concealed. Ford et al. (2002) observed that hidden-value is present in the most uncertain por-
tions of the project, enabling us to sustain that skilled engineers and experienced managers -
whose responsibility is to prepare the bid proposal - have a fairly good knowledge, based on
their accumulated experience, of “where to look for”. Chapman et al. (2000) stated that the
bid preparation process begins with a preliminary assessment of the tender documents. We
sympathize with this statement and argue that, in this preliminary assessment, it is possible
to recognize and quantify hidden-value and, more specifically, to stipulate a high-estimate
2To the best of our knowledge, this designation was first adopted by Ford et al. (2002) and, in the context of
their research, the definition encompasses other sources of hidden-value, rather than just those that may result
in additional income.
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and a low-estimate to this hidden-value and to attribute a probability of occurrence to each of
the estimates just by undertaking a preliminary analysis of the tender documents.3 However,
the quantification of hidden-value with accuracy is, in most practical situations, a goal that
can only be achieved by performing an exhaustive investigation of all the bid documents and
performing studies that often require the use of specific advanced technologies, which many
contractors do not possess. Therefore, many construction companies will have to invest in
human capital and technology by recurring to external firms with the purpose of supplying
managers with more accurate information concerning the project in hands, as Kululanga et al.
(2001) stated.4 In fact, these authors argue that an awareness of job factors, which may give
rise for claiming extra-revenues due to extra-work to be executed is a skill that, generally,
has to be specially acquired. Pinnell (1998) reinforces this argument when he mention that
the individual (or the team) responsible for thoroughly analyzing the bid documents aiming
to capture and quantify hidden-value during the bid preparation process may be a consultant
expert or a team of consultant experts. Whether this incremental investment in hiring skilled
consultants and contracting highly specialized firms aiming to supply contractors with more
accurate information regarding the volume of work to be performed will be worthwhile con-
stitutes the question we will address using the model proposed in Section 3.6.
Our model is thus based on the argument that uncertainty can add value to construction
projects through the impact caused on the amount of work to be executed during the project’s
life cycle. This argument entails that contractors do not know, before the completion of the
project (or, at least, before the job begins), how much volume of work will actually be exe-
cuted. Hence, uncertainty is present concerning the volume of work, allowing us to designate
this specific type of uncertainty, from the contractor’s perspective, as “volume uncertainty”.
Volume uncertainty leads to uncertainty about the project’s final value since the execution
of additional work implies receiving extra income (or extra revenues) and incurring in ex-
tra costs. We will designate, from now on, the difference between these extra revenues and
these extra costs as “additional value”. Additional value is, therefore, the value that may be
generated because there is, at least, a specific source of uncertainty surrounding construction
projects that may actually cause such effect. We now proceed to discuss this subject with
more detail.
3Our model will just consider a specific type of hidden-value: the one that may result in the creation of
additional profit through the execution of more volume of work.
4Specialized firms are frequently hired with the purpose of providing the contractor with more accurate
information concerning the soil and under-soil conditions he or she will encounter in the beginning of the
construction stage. Not rarely, these studies indicate that the type of foundations defined by the client and
included in the bid package is not safe or may need to be preceded by a deeper drilling work.
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3.2 Recognizing and Quantifying Hidden-Value: The Concept of Additional Value
In many construction projects value is hidden in the most uncertain portions of the project, as
we previously mentioned. After its detection and quantification, hidden-value becomes what
we designate as additional value. To fully understand how hidden-value may be detected
and properly quantified - and, hence, transformed into additional value - we must first know
where hidden-value can be detected, which means we have to understand the nature of its
sources.5
The construction management literature has been dedicating considerable attention to a sub-
ject commonly known as “Claims”. A construction claim can be defined as “a request by a
contractor for compensation over and above the agreed-upon contract amount for additional
work or damages supposedly resulting from events that were not included in the initial con-
tract” (Adrian (1993)). This well-known definition implies that contractors can and should
ask for a compensation when they execute works that were not considered in the initial con-
tract.6 Thomas (2001) argued that variations to the work are almost inevitable and Dyer and
Kagel (1996) went even further when they stated that - inevitably (sic) - situations arise where
clients actually deviate from the original construction scope, which means that, most likely,
the initial scope will be increased. These statements strongly sustain our argument that, at
least frequently, contractors do end up executing more work than the one deriving from what
is established in the tender documents. Consequently, both statements also support the argu-
ment that contractors do not know, ex-ante, the precise amount of work they will be executing
throughout the whole construction phase.
Rooke et al. (2004) categorize construction claims in two different types: (i) proactive claims
and (ii) reactive claims. Proactive claims are the ones that can be anticipated and, thus,
planned for at the bid preparation stage. On the other hand, reactive claims are the ones that
can only be recognized in the course of the project itself, in response to unforeseen events.
Even though we are aware that reactive claims may have a substantial impact on the value
of the project, we exclude them from our model precisely because they are, by definition,
unforeseeable, which means that no acceptable estimate can be drawn. Therefore, our model
5The pure detection of hidden-value does not necessarily result in the creation of additional value to the
project. The project value will only increase if the execution of the extra volume of work originates a profit. We
will discuss this important aspect later.
6This definition also implies that there are other sources which may raise more income. However and as
we have been stressing, we are only concerned with the ones directly associated with the possible execution of
more volume of work.
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incorporates estimates for those proactive claims that derive from the presence of uncertainty
regarding the volume of work to be performed.7
3.2.1 Sources of Additional Value
There are two sources of uncertainty that may result in claims through the execution of more
volume of work than the one directly deriving from the information contained in the bid pack-
age. We classify them as being of two different kinds: (i) extra quantities and (ii) additional
orders.
3.2.1.1 Extra Quantities
Extra quantities occur when the contractor ends up executing, in the field, more quantities of
a specific item than the ones specified in the tender documents. As we will see, if the type of
contract allows such, the contractor will receive the unit price included in his or her proposal
multiplied by the quantities he or she has actually executed and after being measured in the
field by the client or the client’s agent.8 Under these contractual conditions, field quantities
are the quantities that matter because they are the ones that will generate the income associ-
ated with the execution of each task included in the bid package. Ideally, from the client’s
point of view, field quantities should match the quantities included in the tender documents.
However, frequently, discrepancies between the quantities estimated by the client and quan-
tities actually executed in the field are observed. The literature refers that this inaccuracy is
mainly due to the poor quality of the tender documents (see, for example, Laryea (2011);
Rooke et al. (2004); Akintoye and Fitzgerald (2000)), meaning that the client’s estimates are
not always accurate and, therefore, tender documents provided to the bidders often contain
mistakes.
Bearing this in mind, most experienced contractors do not take for granted the accuracy of
the information contained in the tender documents regarding the quantities to be performed
when they are preparing the bid. On the contrary, if hidden-value is to be captured and
quantified - since inaccuracies in the tender documents are likely to occur - mistakes can
only be recognized if a proper measurement of all the technical drawings is performed. This
7As we will carefully explain, depending on the contractual arrangements binding the parties, there is a
specific type of volume uncertainty which does not necessarily generate more income.
8Such fact also implies that the contractor will receive less income if the quantities executed in the field are
smaller than the ones specified in the bid documents.
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is an important aspect we must stress: contractors will only know, with a strong degree
of certainty, how many quantities they will be executing during the project’s life cycle if a
thorough and accurate measurement of all the technical drawings included in the bid package
is undertaken. Moreover, as Rooke et al. (2004) stated, pricing a tender involves reading
through bills of quantities often several inches thick, meaning that the quantities stated in the
bill must be confronted with the quantities obtained after performing a complete examination
of all the drawings provided by the client. Rooke et al. (2004) also argued that, most of the
times - especially in the case of non-large contractors - companies do not have experts in this
type of highly skilled job or, if they do, the amount of work in hands in a particular moment
may imply the need for hiring external experts. This aspect is reinforced by the fact that
contractors actually express concern over what they consider to be a short period of time that
is normally allowed for bid preparation, as Laryea and Hughes (2008) observed.
3.2.1.2 Additional Orders
Additional orders, also known as “change orders”, refer to a task or a set of tasks the contrac-
tor effectively performs during the project’s life cycle and that possess a different nature from
the ones specified in the bid package. This source of uncertainty that may give rise to addi-
tional work and extra profit is, thus, different from the one mentioned before, since change
orders are related with varied work which is not of a similar character, or is not carried out
under similar conditions than the one contained in the bid package (Davinson (2003)).9 How-
ever, we need to make clear that these tasks may include, for the purposes of their completion,
the execution of an item or a set of items that actually were considered in the bill of quantities
and previously priced by the bidder, since they were part of the project’s initial scope. Hence,
when contractors look for mistakes in the tender documents, they do not focus their attention
merely in finding discrepancies that may lead to the execution of extra quantities solely asso-
ciated with the tasks specified in the bid package. Instead, experienced engineers and skilled
experts also search for possible tasks, which are likely to be executed and were not specified
in the tender documents. By carefully analyzing all the plans and drawings provided by the
client, it is possible to recognize that some parts of the project (or even the project “seen” as a
whole) will not be properly completed if only the tasks included in the tender documents are
to be performed. Hence, additional orders can and should be considered as a potential source
9Change orders are also often designated as “increase in scope”. The designation acknowledges the fact that
the scope of the original project becomes wider, which means that the contractor will end up executing a certain
number of tasks that were not included in the technical pieces that support the initial contract.
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of additional value and our model will consider this argument by assuming that contractors
are able to stipulate a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate for the amount of addi-
tional orders, and also attribute, to each of these estimates, a probability of occurrence. For
the purpose of accurately defining the two estimates, we argue that contractors need to take
into account: i) the amount of work the additional orders will generate in comparison to the
amount established in the original contract; ii) the previous experience with the client as well
as their history and frequency of placing new orders; iii) the bargaining skills of the client
throughout the negotiation process.
3.2.2 Types of Contract
To fully understand the possible impact of the two sources of additional value on the project’s
final profit, we have to relate each of them with the type of contract that will bind the parties.
Construction management literature addresses with more relevance two types of contracts
(see, for example, Halpin and Senior (2011); Clough et al. (2000); Woodward (1997)): (i) the
“unit-price” type of contract and (ii) the “lump-sum” type of contract.10
The unit-price contract allows for flexibility in meeting variations regarding the amount and
quantity of work encountered during the construction stage. This means that, when this type
of contract is adopted, the project is broken down into work items, which are characterized
by units, such as cubic yards, linear and square feet, and piece numbers (Halpin and Senior
(2011)). This fact implies that the contractor, during the bid preparation stage, will quote
the price by units rather than as a single total contract price. Hence, if for some reason, the
contractor effectively executes more quantities of one or more specific items included in the
tender documents, he or she will be receiving the amount that results from multiplying the
number of units executed by the unit price he or she has included in the bid proposal.
If the type of contract enforced is the lump-sum, bidders are asked to price a specific task
or item, regardless of the number of units that will actually be executed. Hence, if this type
of contract is adopted, contractors will never receive more (less) income for executing more
(less) quantities of an item or items clearly specified by the client than those he or she has
predicted after analyzing the drawings and other technical documents contained in the bid
package. The risk associated with the likelihood of performing more quantities than those
10Other types of contract are mentioned in the literature, as the “cost-plus-fee” type and the “cost-
reimbursement” type. However, unit-price and, especially, lump-sum contracts are the ones that are most
commonly adopted, particularly in the context of bidding competitions.
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that served as the basis for computing the corresponding global price for a specific task (or
a group of tasks) is, thus, borne by the contractor. However, the opposite may also occur:
contractors might actually perform less quantities in the field than those considered during
the bid preparation process, and which served as the basis for establishing the proposed bid
price. Hence, and even though this specific type of uncertainty still exists when the parties
are bounded by a lump-sum contract, it is not possible to account for its effects during the bid
preparation stage since the contractor will only be aware if any additional value is actually
raised through this mean after the task or tasks in question are executed, i.e., as the project
unfolds. Therefore, this source of uncertainty may affect the project value but can not be
quantified before the project is initiated. Being so, in the presence of a lump-sum contract,
additional value may only be obtained through the execution of additional orders whereas, if
the contract assumes the unit-price type, both sources of uncertainty may create additional
value by increasing the volume of work to be performed.11
Lump-sum contracts are the most common type of contracting, especially in the building
sector (Rooke et al. (2004)). In the European Union, current legislation concerning public
contracting virtually imposes the lump-sum form, which means that the unit-price type has
had small to none application due to the increasing effort european regulators have been
exercising with the purpose of transferring the risk associated with possible mistakes (also
referred to, in technical language, as “errors and omissions”) encountered in the technical
pieces from the client to the contractor. This broad reality has compelled us to consider in
our model only one of the two sources of additional value previously described: the additional
value that may rise from the execution of additional orders. Thus, we will assume that the
lump-sum type of contract is the one that actually binds the parties, which means that the
possible execution of more quantities in the field than the ones eventually stated in the bid
documents will not generate any additional revenues and, consequently, any additional value
to the project. This also implies that the costs associated with the possible execution of any
extra quantities should be taken into account when determining the amount of constructions
costs that will sustain the bid price.
11Some projects encompass both types of contracts, which means that some tasks should be priced using
unit-prices and others applying the lump-sum form. In such cases, both types of uncertainty are present, in
different parts of the project.
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3.3 How the Detection of Hidden-Value May Lead to Additional Value: Contrac-
tor’s Opportunistic Bidding Behavior
Construction management literature clearly acknowledges the fact that the construction in-
dustry features strong levels of price competitiveness (see, for example, Chao and Liu (2007);
Skitmore (2002); Ngai et al. (2002)) which may force bidders to lower their profit margin
and, hence, increase the probability of winning the contract (Mohamed et al. (2011)). Con-
sequently, it is not rare to see the winning bid include a near-zero profit margin (Chao and
Liu (2007)) or even a price below-cost. This intense competition encountered in bidding pro-
cesses often leads to “under-pricing”, a common phenomenon namely explained by the need
for work and penetration strategies (Yiu and Tam (2006); Fayek (1998); Drew and Skitmore
(1997)).12
In fact, contractors realize that bidding low when facing strong competition increases the
chance of being selected to execute the project but they are also aware of the opposite: if the
profit margin included in their proposals is higher, the probability of getting the contract will
be lower. This inverse relationship between the level of the profit margin and the probability
of winning the bid is a generally accepted fact both in the construction industry and in the
research community (e.g., Christodoulou (2010); Kim and Reinschmidt (2006); Tenah and
Coulter (1999); Wallwork (1999)). As we will detail, our model incorporates this crucial
element and a mathematical expression that respects the inverse relationship between these
two variables is adopted.
Detecting hidden-value and executing more volume of work will only result in more value to
the project if the difference between the extra revenues and the extra costs of performing the
additional tasks is positive, i.e., if contractors do actually generate a profit by executing them,
which means that detecting and executing more volume of work than the one directly speci-
fied in the tender documents will not necessarily lead to more profit. However, experienced
contractors that capture hidden-value ensure themselves that items where extra quantities are
likely to be executed will be priced in a way that will lead to an increase in the project value.
By applying this practice during the bid preparation stage, contractors increase their probabil-
ity of winning the bid by sacrificing the profit margin included in the bid proposal, knowing
12Under-pricing is not necessarily the same as bidding below-cost; rather, we interpret this concept as the
practice of including in the bid price a profit margin lower than the one contractors would include in normal
circumstances, i.e., if the levels of price competition in the construction industry were not generally perceived
as being particularly intense.
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that they may recover (at least) a part of the profit in subsequent change orders or claims,
as Tan et al. (2008) observed. This type of behavior is designated in the literature as “Op-
portunistic Bidding Behavior” (OBB).13 Thus, following a proactive approach and assuming
that time is actually invested in detecting mistakes that may lead to the likely execution of
more (less) quantities, contractors will inflate (deflate) the unit price of the items where those
mistakes were spotted. Over-charging (under-charging) those items can then be compensated
by under-charging (over-charging) the unit-prices of some of the items whose quantities con-
tractors are certain to be accurately measured. Hence, this compensation mechanism allows
contractors to maintain the previously defined overall price for executing the quantities spec-
ified in the tender documents and, still, leaving room for generating more profit through the
likely execution of additional quantities.
Despite the fact that this behavior is potentially more effective in the presence of a unit-price
form of contract, it may also produce positive effects when the type of contract enforced is
the lump-sum. In fact, experienced contractors will most likely inflate prices of items they
predict to be present in future additional orders since - and even though additional orders
are subject to a specific process of price negotiation - it is likely that they will contain the
execution of certain items which were considered in the original contract and, hence, whose
price is already established between the parties. In these circumstances, the parties will
agree that the unit price for such items will be the same. However, items that are different
from the ones contained in the tender documents become a matter of negotiation between the
contractor and the client or the client’s agent, as Dyer and Kagel (1996) stated. This means
that, unlike what happens with extra quantities, there is no predetermined form of pricing
additional orders in its full extension. In fact, contractors do not have a way of predicting,
with complete certainty, what price will be established and what profit will be generated if
these additional orders are placed by the client.
Nevertheless, based on previous experiences and in current market prices, we believe that
contractors can actually perform fair estimates on the final revenues to be generated by these
additional orders and we also believe that, in the event such orders are placed and the addi-
13The literature identifies two different types of OBB: “front loading” and “claim loading” (see, for example,
Arditi and Chotibhongs (2009); Yiu and Tam (2006)). Front loading consists in over-charging the tasks to be
executed in the early stages of the project’s life cycle and compensate such effect by under-charging the tasks
to be performed in the last stages. We are not concerned with this type of behavior in our model since it does
not derive from any detection of hidden-value.
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tional work executed, a considerable profit will be made.14
The remainder of the present Chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 3.4 we introduce the
model’s basic numerical solution that we have thoroughly described in Chapter II, and which
will enable us to reach the optimal price if no detection and quantification of hidden-value is
considered. After listing the assumptions in Section 3.5, we proceed to describe the model in
Section 3.6. In Section 3.7, a numerical example is given, followed by a sensitivity analysis
to some of the model’s most important parameters. Finally, in Section 3.8, conclusions and
remarks are given.
3.4 The Model
3.4.1 Introduction
The model herein suggested is based on the option to sign the contract and, consequently,
to invest in performing the project by the selected bidder. In a bidding competition, the
contractor prepares the bid proposal and submits it until a certain date previously defined
by the client. However, the client will only decide which bidder will be invited to sign the
contract months later. Consequently, the estimated constructions costs that served as the basis
to establish the price included in the bid proposal will most likely vary during this period,
i.e., from the moment the bid proposal is closed until the selected bidder is invited to sign the
contract. On the contrary, the price established by the contractor and proposed to the client
will remain unchanged during the same period. Recognizing these facts, we have identified,
in Chapter II, a specific real option: the option to sign the contract and, hence, to invest in
performing the project by the selected bidder. This option constitutes a real option since the
selected bidder has the right - but not the obligation - to sign the contract and, consequently, to
invest in executing the job by incurring in the necessary costs to complete it - the construction
costs. As the option pricing theory states, this real option has value and, in Chapter II, we
used an adapted version of the Margrabe (1978) exchange option pricing model to evaluate
this option, with the final purpose of reaching an optimal price. According to the model
proposed in Chapter II, the optimal price will be the one corresponding to the highest value of
14Dyer and Kagel (1996) conducted a study where a number of general contractors were interviewed. Addi-
tional orders were frequently mentioned as being particularly profitable. It is generally accepted in the industry
that the negotiation process leading to the price determination of new orders often develops in a very favorable
manner to the contractor, mainly due to the client’s awareness that the decision to switch to another contractor
for merely executing those additional tasks will imply incurring in side costs and will also cause time delays.
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the option to invest, weighted by the probability of winning the bid, since the option can only
be exercised by the selected bidder. We then proposed a mathematical relationship linking
the level of the profit margin (or the “mark-up”, as it is commonly designated in construction
parlance) and the probability of winning the contract. This mathematical expression respects
the generally accepted fact that there is an inverse relationship between the two variables,
as we previously mentioned. In fact, even though construction managers seldom support
their mark-up decisions using some sort of mathematical expression linking the price and
the probability of winning the bid, which means that the decision regarding the mark-up bid
value is generally sustained in subjective judgments, gut feelings and heuristics (Hartono and
Yap (2011)), managers have, at least, an implicit perception that the higher (lower) the profit
margin he or she includes in the bid proposal the lower (higher) will be the probability of
winning the bid.
Being so, the numerical solution we proposed in Chapter II has two components: (i) the value
of the option to sign the contract and, consequently, to invest in executing the project; (ii) the
probability of winning the bid. We briefly present each of them again below.
3.4.1.1 The Value of Option to Sign the Contract and Invest in Performing the Project
in the Presence of Penalty Costs
In Chapter II, we discussed that, in some legal environments, a financial compensation may
be imposed to the selected contractor if he or she declines the invitation to sign the contract.
In fact, and according to Halpin and Senior (2011), in the United States contractors are free
to withdraw their bids without incurring in any penalties if that happens prior to the ending of
the bidding period. However, if the selected bidder decides to withdraw the proposal after that
moment, a penalty equal to the difference between the second best proposal and the chosen
bid may be legally imposed, even if the contract has not yet been signed. To accommodate
these circumstances, we adapted the Margrabe (1978) exchange option pricing formula. Let
Pg denote the bid price when penalty costs are considered. The value of the option to invest,
Fg(Pg,K) in the presence of penalty costs, g will be given by the following equation:15
Fg(Pg,K) = [Pge−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2)−gK(1−N(d2)] (3.1)
15Penalty costs may also be seen as possessing a reputational nature, as we have mentioned.
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being (d1) and (d2):
d1 =
ln[Pg/(1−g)K− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t (3.2)
d2 = d1− (σ
√
T − t) (3.3)
where K designates the construction costs, N(d1) and N(d2) are the probability density func-
tions for the values that result from expressions (d1) and (d2), respectively, r is the risk-free
interest rate, σ is the standard deviation and σ2 is the variance, which, in this case, equals
σ2K .16 T−t is the ’time to expiration’, i.e., the time between the moment the bid price is es-
tablished and the moment the contractor is invited to sign the contract, and g is the expected
value for the penalty costs. As explained in the previous Chapter, we will assume that the
value of the penalty costs, g is a percentage of K, the construction costs.17
3.4.1.2 The Probability of Winning the Bid
In Chapter II, we proposed an inverse relationship linking the mark-up ratio and the proba-
bility of winning the bid, given by the following equation:
W (P,K) = e−b(P/K)
n
(3.4)
where W (P,K) is the probability of winning the bid, P/K is the mark-up ratio and ’n’ and
’b’ are parameters included in the equation for calibration purposes. As we have argued in
Chapter II, these parameters should be calibrated in order to best reflect each contractor’s
specific circumstances and the conditions surrounding the project in hands. Parameter ’b’
16Since σ2 = σ2P − 2σPσKρPK +σ2K , where ρPK is the correlation coefficient between the price, P and the
construction costs, K; since P remains unchanged during the life of the option, then σ2P equals zero and so does
2σPσKρPK .
17In the absence of penalty costs, g equals zero and, thus, the Margrabe (1978) formula is reduced to the
original form: F(P,K) = [Pe−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2)], where:
d1 =
ln(P/K)− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t
and d2 remains unchanged.
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sets the probability of winning the bid if the price equals the construction costs, i.e., if the
mark-up ratio equals 1. Parameter ’n’ is responsible for shaping the function’s concavity and
convexity. Our model embraces this functional relationship and a specific calibration for each
of the parameters will be specified in the numerical example presented in Section 3.7.
3.4.1.3 The Base Price
We designate the “base price”, in the context of the present model, as being the optimal price
that results from the maximization problem proposed in Chapter II. We will adopt that nu-
merical solution to determine this price. The base price is the price contractors should include
in their bid proposal if no detection and quantification of hidden-value that may lead to the
generation of additional profit through the execution of additional orders is to be undertaken,
in accordance with the assumptions listed below in Section 3.5. Hence, the base price is
the optimal price without considering those effects or, which is the same, the optimal price
that derives from considering the value solely generated through the execution of the tasks
included in the bid package.
Assuming that penalty costs, g are present, let Pb designate the base price. Pb will be the
outcome of the maximization problem:
V (Pb,Kb) = max
Pb
{[(Pbe−r(T−t))N(d1)−KN(d2)−gKb(1−N(d2))]
[e−b(Pb/Kb)
n
]} (3.5)
where Kb is the amount of costs the contractor will have to incur in order to exclusively
perform the amount of work specified in the initial contract, i.e., the base construction costs.
Thus, the option value for each mark-up level, Vg(Pb,Kb) will be given by the outcome of the
adapted Margrabe (1978) formula, Fg(Pb,Kb) weighted by the probability of winning the bid,
W (Pb,Kb).
3.5 Assumptions
We will assume that (i) each bidder decides what price to bid without engaging in any kind of
interaction or contact with other bid participants; (ii) each bidder prepares his or her proposal
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simultaneously with the other competitors; (iii) each bidder presents a single-sealed proposal
to the client; (iv) each bidder has access to the information contained in the bid package,
allowing him or her to establish the base price, determined applying the maximization prob-
lem given by equation (3.5); (v) the selected bidder will only decide if he or she is going to
perform the project when the contract has to be signed and not before that date; (vi) it is pos-
sible to establish a mathematical relationship between the mark-up level and the probability
of winning the bid and the expression linking these two variables is given by equation (3.4);
(vii) penalty costs are present if the selected contractor decides not to sign the contract and,
consequently, not invest in executing the project; (viii) the parties are bound by a lump-sum
contract, which means that no additional income is generated if extra quantities are executed;
(ix) by only using the skills of their own experienced staff, contractors are able to stipulate a
high-value estimate and a low-value estimate for the expected profit to be generated through
the execution of additional orders and also to attribute a probability of occurrence to each
of them, during the bid preparation stage; (x) once the true estimate is known, contractors
will adjust the price (extra revenues) during the negotiation process to compensate for any
variations that may occur in the estimated extra costs, which means that any changes ob-
served in the necessary costs to perform the additional orders will lead to an adjustment in
the price requested to the client, with the purpose of maintaining the expected profit at the
level previously established during the bid preparation period.
3.6 Model Description
3.6.1 Introduction
The present model is motivated by the fact that, in most construction projects, the volume of
work to be executed is not known with precision during the bid preparation stage. Hence,
uncertainty is present concerning the level of profit to be generated. Even though we have
identified two different sources of volume uncertainty, we will only focus on the one deriving
from the possible execution of additional orders to be placed by the client, since we are
assuming that the parties are bound by a lump-sum contract - thus preventing contractors
from generating extra revenues by merely executing extra quantities of items included in the
bid package.
As previously mentioned, we will consider that experienced contractors are be able to stip-
ulate a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate to the additional orders and to attribute
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a probability of occurrence to each of them just by undertaking a preliminary assessment of
the tender documents, which means that this goal can be achieved without the need to incur
in any additional costs associated with hiring skilled professionals and contracting special-
ized firms, i.e., without any incremental investment in human capital and technology. For the
sake of simplicity, we will refer to the mere allocation of working time of the persons pos-
sessing the necessary skills to perform these tasks (e.g., engineers and estimators) as “non-
incremental investment”. Let C1 designate the level of this non-incremental investment that
contractors will undertake using only the skills of their own experienced staff. By investing
the amount C1, contractors will thus (i) define a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate
for the price (revenues) to be obtained through the execution of additional orders; (ii) stip-
ulate a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate for the necessary costs to successfully
perform these orders; (iii) attribute a probability of occurrence to each of the estimates.
Therefore, by investing the amount C1, contractors will be establishing a discrete-time stochas-
tic variable, designated as “additional value”, with two possible outcomes, and affecting a
probability of occurrence to each of them.
3.6.2 The Impact of the Non-Incremental Investment
The base price, Pb represents the amount of income to be received due to the execution of the
volume of work included in the bid package: this is the price resulting from expression (3.5)
presented above and - again - we stress that this is the optimal price contractors should include
in their proposals if no detection and quantification of any additional value deriving from the
execution of additional orders is undertaken. By investing the amount C1, contractors will
most likely detect and quantify hidden-value, which may result in the creation of additional
value to the project. Hence, we first need to consider the additional income that will be
received, assuming that additional orders will be executed during the project’s life cycle and,
secondly, the necessary costs to successfully perform the additional work. Being so, let pA
represent the additional income (extra revenues) that derives from the possible execution of
additional orders, and kA the amount of costs the contractor will have to incur in order to
perform these new orders. Finally, pi represents the amount of profit (or additional value)
generated by executing the additional orders, i.e., the difference between pA and kA.
Also, let (i) pHA designate the high-value estimate for the revenues associated with the exe-
cution of the additional orders; (ii) pLA designate the low-value estimate for such revenues;
(iii) kHA designate the high-value estimate for the costs associated with the execution of the
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additional orders; (iv) kLA designate the low-value estimate for such costs; (v) θ represent
the probability associated with pHA and k
H
A ; hence (1− θ) is the probability associated with
pLA and k
L
A. Finally, let pi
H and piL denote the additional profit for the high-value and the
low-value estimates, respectively. piH and piL will be given by the following equations:
piH = pHA − kHA (3.6)
piL = pLA− kLA (3.7)
Thus, the expected value for the additional profit, E(pi) will be given by equation (3.8):
E(pi) = piHθ +piL(1−θ) (3.8)
Let P1 designate the optimal price in the present conditions, i.e., the price that incorporates the
effect of the expected value for the additional profit, E(pi), given by equation (3.8). Hence,
we adapt equation (3.5) with the purpose of incorporating the effects caused by the expected
value for the additional profit, E(pi). Let P∗1 denote the optimal price according to these
conditions. Hence, P∗1 will be the outcome for the following maximization problem:
V (P1,Kb) = max
P1
{[((P1+E(pi))e−r(T−t))N(d1)−KbN(d2)−
gKb(1−N(d2))][e−b(P1/Kb)n]} (3.9)
The optimal price, P∗1 that results from the maximization problem given by equation (3.9)
is smaller than the one resulting from the maximization problem given by equation (3.5),
i.e., the base price, Pb since the former is the optimal price in the absence of any recognition
and quantification of hidden-value generating more profit through the execution of additional
orders, whereas the latter reflects the optimal price considering the expected impact of the
additional orders to be performed, at this stage, by investing the amount C1.18 This means
that P∗1 is the price contractors should include in their bid proposals because it is the optimal
18This implies that the expected value for the additional profit, E(pi) is greater than zero.
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price if no incremental investment is undertaken.
We also need to make clear that equation (3.9) is a function of Kb - the direct costs of solely
performing the tasks included in the tender documents - rather than the total estimated costs
the contractor will incur if he or she wins the contract and performs the project. This is due to
the fact that the extra costs are already considered in the amount of the expected profit which,
as the same equation shows, integrates the maximization problem given by equation (3.9).
Being so, the probability of winning the contract adopting the optimal price, P∗1 will given by
the following equation:
W (P∗1 ,Kb) = e
−b(P∗1 /Kb)n (3.10)
The outcome of equation (3.10) is greater than the outcome of equation (3.4). In fact, the
probability of winning the contract considering the effects of investing C1 will always be
greater than the probability considering the base price, Pb, because P∗1 - and assuming that
some hidden-value is captured and quantified at this stage - is smaller than the base price,
Pb, i.e., the optimal price if no quantification of hidden-value is considered, as we have men-
tioned. Thus, just by investing the amount C1, contractors will produce a more competi-
tive bid price, provided that some hidden-value leading to the generation of additional profit
through the execution of additional orders has actually been captured and quantified.
3.6.2.1 The Value of the Option to Sign the Contract and Perform the Project
Considering the effects of the expected additional profit, E(pi), the value of the option to
invest, V (P1,Kb) will be given by the following equation:
V (P∗1 ,Kb) = {[(P∗1 +E(pi))e−r(T−t)N(d1)−KbN(d2)−
gKb(1−N(d2))][e−b(P∗1 /Kb)n]} (3.11)
being:
d1 =
ln[(P∗1 +E(pi))/(1−g)Kb]− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t (3.12)
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and
d2 = d1− (σ
√
T − t) (3.13)
N(d1) and N(d2) the probability density functions for the values resulting from expressions
(d1) and (d2), respectively, r is the risk-free interest rate, σ is the standard deviation and σ2
is the variance which, as we have mentioned, equals σ2K . T−t is the ’time to expiration’, i.e.,
the time between the moment the price included in the bid proposal is established and the
moment the contractor is invited to sign the contract and, finally, g is the estimated level of
penalty costs.
Equation (3.11) determines the value of the option to invest if the expected value for the
additional profit to be generated by executing the additional orders, E(pi) is, in fact, the true
value. Thus, if no incremental investment is put through, the outcome of equation (3.11) is
the value of the option to sign the contract and perform the project after the amount C1 has
been invested and assuming that some hidden-value, resulting in more volume of work, was
captured and quantified as a direct result of such investment.
3.6.3 The Impact of the Incremental Investment in Human Capital and Technology
As we mentioned previously, construction companies often have to invest in human capital
and technology and, hence, hire skilled technicians and/or highly specialized firms possessing
the necessary know-how and technology to perform specific studies, whose purpose is to
supply managers with more accurate information concerning the project in hands, during the
bid preparation stage. Let C2 denote the value of this incremental investment, which will
allow the contractor to eliminate the uncertainty concerning the true value of the additional
work to be performed and the extra profit to be generated through the execution of such
additional work. Hence, after investing the amount C2, the contractor may face two different
scenarios since this investment will reveal if the true value is the high estimate or the low
estimate, previously defined. Being so, we first need to determine the optimal price and the
corresponding value of the option to invest, for each of the scenarios.
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3.6.3.1 The Optimal Price and the Value of the Option to Invest Considering the High-
Value Estimate
If the investment in C2 reveals that the true value for the additional profit, pi is given by the
high-estimate, then the optimal price in these conditions, P∗H2 will be the outcome of the
maximization problem given by equation (3.14):
V (PH2 ,Kb) = max
PH2
{[(PH2 +piH)e−r(T−t)N(d1)−KN(d2)−
gKb(1−N(d2))][e−b(PH2 /Kb)n]} (3.14)
where:
d1 =
ln[(PH2 +pi
H)/(1−g)Kb]− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t (3.15)
and
d2 = d1− (σ
√
T − t) (3.16)
The value of the option to invest, assuming that the true value for the additional profit equals
the high-value estimate, is given by the following equation:
V (P∗
H
2 ,Kb) = [(P
∗H
2 +pi
H)e−(T−t)N(d1)−KbN(d2)−
gKb(1−N(d2))][e−b(P∗
H
2 /Kb)
n
] (3.17)
3.6.3.2 The Optimal Price and the Value of the Option to Invest Considering the Low-
Value Estimate
However, if the true value revealed for pi is given by the low-estimate, then the optimal price,
P∗L2 will be the outcome of the following maximization problem:
55
V (PL2 ,Kb) = max
PL2
{[(PL2 +piL)e−r(T−t)N(d1)−KbN(d2)−
gKb(1−N(d2))][e−b(PL2 /Kb)n]} (3.18)
And the value of the option to invest, in these conditions, will be given by equation (3.19):
V (P∗
L
2 ,Kb) = [(P
∗L
2 +pi
L)e−r(T−t)N(d1)−KbN(d2)−
gKb(1−N(d2))][e−b(P∗
L
2 /Kb)
n
] (3.19)
being:
d1 =
ln[(P∗L2 +pi
L)/(1−g)Kb]− (r− 12σ2)(T−t)
σ
√
T−t (3.20)
and
d2 = d1− (σ
√
T − t) (3.21)
3.6.4 The Threshold Value for the Incremental Investment
By (i) weighting the outcome of equation (3.17) by the probability associated with the high-
value estimate; (ii) weighting the outcome of equation (3.19) by the probability associated
with the low-estimate and (iii) adding up these two results, we reach the value of the option
to invest considering the two scenarios, V (P∗2 ,Kb). Hence:
V (P∗2 ,Kb) = θV (P
∗H
2 ,Kb)+(1−θ)V (P∗
L
2 ,Kb) (3.22)
The outcome of equation (3.11) is the value of the option to invest considering solely the
effects produced by the non-incremental investment, C1, i.e., V (P∗1 ,Kb). Equation (3.22)
determines the value of the option considering the effects of the incremental investment,
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C2, considering both scenarios together, each weighted by the corresponding probability of
occurrence. Hence, the difference between the outcome of equation (3.22) and the outcome
of equation (3.11) is the exact amount of the incremental investment, C2, below which any
level of incremental investment will add value to the project. Let C∗2 denote this threshold
value for the incremental investment. C∗2 will thus be given by the following equation:
C∗2 = V (P
∗
2 ,Kb)−V (P∗1 ,Kb) (3.23)
and the ratio between the incremental investment threshold and the base construction costs is
as follows:
RC∗2 =
C∗2
Kb
(3.24)
3.7 Numerical Example
3.7.1 The Base Case
The following table includes information about the inputs used in the present numerical ex-
ample:
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Table 3.1: inputs: description and values
Inputs Description Values
Kb base construction costs C 100,000,000
σ standard deviation 0.25
r risk-free interest rate 0.01
T − t “time to expiration” 0.5 (years)
n calibration parameter of the function W(P,K) 10
b calibration parameter of the function W(P,K) ln(1/0.5)
g penalty costs 0.02
pHA high-value estimate for the additional revenues C 30,000,000
kHA high-value estimate for the additional costs C 15,000,000
pLA low-value estimate for the additional revenues C 9,000,000
kLA low-value estimate for the additional costs C 6,000,000
θ probability of occurrence of the high-value estimate 0.5
(1−θ) probability of occurrence of the low-value estimate 0.5
Using the inputs listed above and applying the model described in Section 3.6, we have
reached the following outputs:
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Table 3.2: outputs: description, values and corresponding equations
Outputs Description Values Equation
Pb base price C 101,942,247 (3.5)
piH additional profit considering the high-value estimate C 15,000,000 (3.6)
piL additional profit considering the low-value estimate C 3,000,000 (3.7)
E(pi) expected value for the additional profit C 9,000,000 (3.8)
P∗1 optimal price after investing C1 C 99,000,845 (3.9)
W (P∗1 ,Kb) probability of winning with price P
∗
1 53,42% (3.10)
V (P∗1 ,Kb) option value after investing C1 C 6,091,160 (3.11)
P∗H2 optimal price considering the high-value estimate C 97,250,537 (3.14)
θV (P∗H2 ,Kb) option value considering the high-value estimate C 4,325,005 (3.17)
P∗L2 optimal price considering the low-value estimate C 100,911,754 (3.18)
(1−θ)V (P∗L2 ,Kb) option value considering the low-value estimate C 2,012,839 (3.19)
V (P∗2 ,Kb) option value considering both estimates C 6,337,844 (3.22)
C∗2 incremental investment threshold value C 246,684 (3.23)
RC∗2 investment threshold / base construction costs 0.247% (3.24)
3.7.2 Sensitivity Analysis
3.7.2.1 Is There a Scale-Effect?
Assuming that the project dimension is given by the value of the base construction costs, Kb,
we performed a sensitivity analysis with the purpose of verifying if a scale-effect is present,
i.e., if the investment threshold ratio, RC∗2 assumes different values in response to variations
in the amount of the base construction costs. We defined two alternative scenarios, where (i)
the amount of the base construction costs are twice as great and four times as great as in the
base case, i.e., equal to C 200,000,000 and C 400,000,000, (ii) the level for the high-value
estimate and the low-value estimate of the additional profit respects this same proportion
and (iii) the corresponding probabilities of occurrence remain unchanged. We reached the
following results for the incremental investment threshold value, C∗2 and for the incremental
investment threshold ratio, RC∗2 :
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Table 3.3: sensitivity analysis: scale-effect
(for: σ = 0.25; r =0.01; T − t = 0.5; n = 10; b = ln(1/0.5); g = 0.02)
base case alternative scenario 1 alternative scenario 2
Kb C 100,000,000 C 200,000,000 C 400,000,000
piH C 15,000,000 C 30,000,000 C 60,000,000
piL C 3,000,000 C 6,000,000 C 12,000,000
θ 50% 50% 50%
(1−θ) 50% 50% 50%
E(pi) C 9,000,000 C 18,000,000 C 36,000,000
C∗2 C 246,684 C 493,368 C 986,736
RC∗2 0.247% 0.247% 0.247%
The results included in Table 3.3 clearly demonstrate that the incremental investment thresh-
old value is proportional to the amount of the base construction costs, which means that no
scale-effect is present. In fact, for the three dimensions considered, the ratio between the
incremental investment threshold and the base construction costs remains constant and equal
to 0.247%, which means that there is a linear relationship between them.
3.7.2.2 The Impact of Variations in the Probabilities Associated with the High/Low
Value Estimates
The results concerning the impact of considering different levels for the probabilities associ-
ated with the high-value and the low-value estimates on the model’s outcome are included in
Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: sensitivity analysis: probabilities associated with high/low value estimates
(for information about the inputs used, please refer to Table 3.1)
θ (1−θ) E(pi) V (P∗1 ,Kb) V (P∗2 ,Kb) C∗2 RC∗2
99% 1% C 14,880,000 C 8,594,122 C 8,603,767 C 9,645 0.01%
90% 10% C 13,800,000 C 8,009,638 C 8,187,667 C 88,029 0.09%
80% 20% C 12,600,000 C 7,568,344 C 7,725,143 C 156,799 0.16%
70% 30% C 11,400,000 C 7,056,369 C 7,262,710 C 206,341 0.21%
60% 40% C 10,200,000 C 6,563,919 C 6,800,277 C 236,358 0.24%
50% 50% C 9,000,000 C 6,091,160 C 6,337,844 C 246,684 0.247%
40% 60% C 7,800,000 C 5,638,219 C 5,875,410 C 237,191 0.24%
30% 70% C 6,600,000 C 5,205,182 C 5,412,977 C 207,795 0.21%
20% 80% C 5,400,000 C 4,792,090 C 4,950,544 C 158,453 0.16%
10% 90% C 4,200,000 C 4,398,939 C 4,488,110 C 89,171 0.09%
1% 99% C 3,120,000 C 4,062,110 C 4,071,920 C 9,810 0.01%
C
The results included in Table 3.4 clearly show that, the closer the probabilities are to the upper
limit or the lower limit, the smaller is the investment threshold value. The explanation resides
in the fact that, the closer the probabilities are to 100% or to 0%, the lower is the uncertainty
regarding which will be the true value, meaning that the incremental investment assumes now
a lower importance in resolving this uncertainty. The two more extreme scenarios clearly
reflect this: when parameter θ equals 99% or 1%, the investment threshold assumes very low
values (C 9,645 and C 9,810, respectively). On the contrary, as probabilities tend to 50%,
the higher is the threshold value, C∗2 . Thus, the incremental investment threshold reaches
the maximum value when the level of uncertainty is the highest, i.e., when the probabilities
associated with the two estimates are the same.
3.7.2.3 The Impact of Variations in the Difference Between the Two Estimates
Table 3.5 includes values concerning three different scenarios and the results reached by
changing the difference between the high-value and low-value estimates but assuming that
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both the expected profit, E(pi) and the probabilities of occurrence, θ and (1− θ) remain
unchanged.
Table 3.5: sensitivity analysis: difference between the high and the low value estimates
(for: σ = 0.25; r = 0.01; T − t = 0.5; n = 10; b = ln(1/0.5); g = 0.02)
base case alternative scenario 1 alternative scenario 2
Kb C 100,000,000 C 100,000,000 C 100,000,000
piH C 15,000,000 C 17,000,000 C 13,000,000
piL C 3,000,000 C 1,000,000 C 5,000,000
(piH −piL) C 12,000,000 C 16,000,000 C 8,000,000
θ 50% 50% 50%
E(pi) C 9,000,000 C 9,000,000 C 9,000,000
V (P∗1 ,Kb) C 6,091,160 C 6,091,160 C 6,091,160
V (P∗2 ,Kb) C 6,337,844 C 6,528,210 C 6,201,066
C∗2 C 246,684 C 437,050 C 109,906
RC∗2 0.247% 0.437% 0.110%
In the alternative scenario 1, the difference between the two estimates is greater than in the
base case. The results show that, when this difference increases from C 12,000,000 (the
difference in the base case) to C 16,000,000, the incremental investment threshold also in-
creases (from C 246,684 to C 437,050). The explanation resides in the fact that contractors
face more uncertainty concerning which of the two estimates will become the true value and,
hence, the incremental investment assumes a higher importance in resolving such uncertainty.
In fact, the corresponding threshold value is greater since the increase in the value of the op-
tion to invest considering both estimates, V (P∗2 ,Kb) assumes now a higher value, whereas the
value of the option to invest considering solely the effects of the non-incremental investment,
V (P∗1 ,Kb) remains unchanged. On the contrary, for a smaller difference between the two es-
timates (C 8,000,000), as the results reached for the alternative scenario 2 clearly reflect, the
investment threshold is smaller: C109,906, compared to C 246,684, in the base case. The
level of uncertainty associated with the two estimates is now lower and this lower level of
uncertainty is reflected in the value of option to invest considering both estimates, V (P∗2 ,Kb).
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The value of this option is, in the alternative scenario 2, smaller than in the other two cases
and, thus, closer to the value of the option to invest considering only the investment in C1,
V (P∗1 ,Kb), whose value does not depend upon the differences between the two estimates,
since the expected value for the additional profit, E(pi) remains unchanged.
We thus conclude that, the higher (lower) the difference between the high-value estimate and
the low-value estimate, the higher (lower) will be the uncertainty concerning which estimate
will become the true value, and the higher (lower) will be the value of the option to invest
considering the two estimates, V (P2,Kb). Consequently - since the value of the option to
invest considering only the effects of the non-incremental investment, V (P1,Kb) remains un-
changed - the greater (smaller) will be the value for investment threshold, C∗2 , and the greater
(smaller) will be the value of the ratio RC∗2 .
3.8 Conclusions and Remarks
Several types of uncertainty surround construction projects and construction managers should
proactively manage the effects they may produce in the project value. We approached a spe-
cific type of uncertainty and designated it as “volume uncertainty”. This type of uncertainty
is critical since, at least frequently, managers do not know with precision the amount of work
they will be executing throughout the project’s life cycle and, consequently, the expected final
profit the project will generate. To assess the impact of volume uncertainty on the value of the
project, we defined a discrete-time stochastic variable and designated it as “additional value”.
Additional value is the value that is hidden in the the most uncertain parts of the project and,
in the context of the present research, is defined as the one that does not derive from merely
executing the tasks specified in the bid package.
To capture and quantify this type of value, construction companies need to invest. Initially,
by merely applying the skills of his or her own experienced staff, construction managers are
able to define a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate for the additional profit and
to stipulate a probability of occurrence to each of the estimates. Based on the numerical
solution proposed in Chapter II, we suggested a model which determines that managers will
produce a more competitive bid even if no incremental investment is undertaken, provided
that some hidden-value is captured and quantified during the bid preparation stage. However,
in order to resolve the uncertainty concerning which of the two estimates will become the true
value for the expected additional profit, contractors often need to invest in human capital and
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technology and, thus, hire specialized firms and highly skilled professionals. The model’s
outcome is the threshold value for this incremental investment. Therefore, managers may use
a simple decision rule: hire external services with the purpose of eliminating the uncertainty
concerning which of the two estimates previously established is the true value, provided that
the cost of this incremental investment in human capital and technology does not exceed
the threshold value previously determined. Any amount paid for external services, which
is lower than the threshold value, will lead to an increase the project value and, the lower
this cost, the higher will be the increase in the project value. On the contrary, if the amount
actually invested exceeds the predetermined threshold value, the value of the project will
be reduced. The model also determines the optimal bid price in the case no incremental
investment in human capital and technology is undertaken, in the case the true value reached
by undertaking the incremental investment equals the high-estimate for the additional value
and also in the case the true value equals the low-estimate for the additional value, both
previously stipulated.
Sensitivity analysis showed that no scale-effect is present in the model since the incremental
investment threshold value responds linearly to variations in the project dimension. Sensitiv-
ity analysis also showed that, the closer to 50% is the probability of occurrence associated
with the estimates, the greater the threshold value is since undertaking the incremental in-
vestment assumes a higher importance due to the presence of higher levels of uncertainty
concerning which of the two estimates will become the true value. Finally, sensitivity analy-
sis performed to the difference between the two estimates established for the additional value
demonstrated that, the greater the difference between the two estimates the higher the level
of uncertainty concerning which of them will become the true value. As a result, the in-
cremental investment assumes a greater importance in eliminating this uncertainty and this
greater importance is reflected in a higher threshold value for the incremental investment.
On the contrary, if the difference between the two estimates is smaller, the level of uncer-
tainty present is lower, which means that the incremental investment assumes now a smaller
importance in resolving this uncertainty and, as a consequence, the incremental investment
threshold assumes a lower value.
64
Chapter 4
A Two-Factor Uncertainty Model to
Determine the Optimal Contractual
Penalty for a Build-Own-Transfer Project
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects in the Context of Bidding Competi-
tions
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) became one of the most important types of public procure-
ment arrangements and its importance has been growing considerably in the last decades
(Kwak et al. (2009); Alonso-Conde et al. (2007); Algarni et al. (2007); Ho and Liu (2002)).
PPP is usually defined as a long-term development and service contract between the govern-
ment and a private partner (Maskin and Tirole (2008)). This type of contract may assume
different forms and the Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) model is widely adopted (Liu and Cheah
(2009); Ho and Liu (2002)). BOT is the terminology for a project structure that uses private
investment to undertake the infrastructure development, and which has been historically en-
sured by the public sector.1 In fact, the private sector has been playing an increasingly crucial
1The acronym BOT is often used interchangeably with BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer). Other arrange-
ments include BOO (build-own-operate), a type of contractual scheme where the private party does not carry
the obligation of transferring the ownership in any date, meaning that the private partner may operate the facility
forever, as in the case of a typical private investment project.
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role in the financing and provision of services that were traditionally in the domain of the
public sector. One of the key reasons is that governments are unable to cope with the ever-
increasing demands on their budgets. Most infrastructure expenditures in developing - and
also in developed countries - have been funded directly from fiscal budgets but several factors
such as the macroeconomic instability and growing investment needs have shown that public
finance is volatile and, in many of those countries, rarely meet the infrastructure expenditure
requirements in a timely and adequate manner (Ferreira and Khatami (1996)).
In BOT projects, a private entity is given a concession to build an infrastructure and oper-
ate a facility which, as we just mentioned, would traditionally be built and operated by the
government or a public entity (Shen and Wu (2005)). At the end of the predetermined con-
cession period (a period that tends to be long), the private party returns the ownership of the
infrastructure to the government or the public entity (Shen et al. (2002)).2
BOT infrastructure projects also differ significantly from the construction projects we have
considered in Chapters II and III in how they are implemented during the pre-construction
phase. In the case of construction projects, the public party is responsible for project plan-
ning, property acquisition and, more importantly, project funding. In BOT projects, the con-
cessionaire (private party) is usually required to undertake these project development tasks
(Huang and Chou (2006)). This contractual arrangement provides a mechanism for using
private finance, hence allowing the public sector to construct more infrastructure services
without the use of additional public funds (Shen and Wu (2005)) .
BOT projects are awarded through an appropriate bidding competition process, where a num-
ber of private entities compete to win the contract. As with the other type of construction
projects - and all other things being equal - the contract will be awarded to the bidder that
presented the most competitive bid, which, in the case of BOT projects, means the bidder that
offered the highest price.3 The price is the amount to be paid to the government to own the
right to operate the facility once the obligation of constructing the infrastructure is fulfilled.
Hence, the selected bidder will be invited to sign the contract and - if the contract is actu-
ally signed - he or she will have to invest in constructing the facility and run the subsequent
operations, once the construction phase is completed.
2Given that BOT/BOOT schemes are designed and implemented as Public-Private Partnership contractual
arrangements, we will consider, for the purpose of the present work, BOT and PPP designations as being
synonyms.
3In construction projects - and all other things being equal - the selected bidder is the one that presented the
lowest bid. For obvious reasons, in a BOT project competitive bid, is the other way around: all else equal, the
selected bidder will be the one that offered the highest price.
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4.1.2 The Real Options Approach in the BOT Projects Literature
A considerable number of research pieces can be found where the real options approach is
applied to address different questions concerning BOT projects. Some of the most important
issues concern project valuation, how several risk types should be shared between the parties,
the role of incentives and subsidies given by the government or the public entity and also the
well-known mechanism of the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG). By addressing these
topics using the real options approach, researchers seem to acknowledge that a number of
real options are available to both parties throughout the life of the project. Thus, flexibility
is a feature that can be frequently found on existing contracts and the levels of uncertainty
surrounding this type of projects tend to be high. By recognizing the irreversibility of this
type of investments and also the uncertainty and flexibility that characterize BOT projects,
some researchers adopt the real options methodology to evaluate options embedded in current
contract types, while others use it to sustain and propose different forms of shaping contracts
between the parties, namely by suggesting that incorporating more flexibility in the contrac-
tual relationship may lead to more economic efficiency at different levels. Various research
pieces can be found focusing on one or more of these research topics. For example, Huang
and Chou (2006) valued the MRG and the option to abandon the project by the private firm,
and Brandao and Saraiva (2008) also developed a model for infrastructure projects based on
the consideration of a Minimum Demand Guarantee. Cheah and Liu (2006) addressed the
valuation of demand and revenue guarantees, applying Monte Carlo simulation, and Chiara
et al. (2007) also applied the same technique to evaluate a MRG which is only redeemable
at specific moments in time. Alonso-Conde et al. (2007) addressed the existing contractual
conditions in PPP which guarantee a minimum profitability to the private firm. Shan et al.
(2010) proposed collar options (a call option and a put option combined) to better manage
revenue risks. Huang and Pi (2009) applied a sequential compound option approach for valu-
ing multi-stage BOT projects, in the presence of dedicated assets. Caselli et al. (2009) valued
the indemnification provision that ensures a final compensation to the private partner, in the
event the government terminates a BOT contract. Armada et al. (2012) showed how the net
cost of incentives, which may be given by the government to induce immediate investment,
should equal the value of the option to defer the beginning of operations by the private firm.
Pereira et al. (2006) applied a two-factor uncertainty model aiming to reach the optimal tim-
ing for the construction of an international airport, where the cash flows to be generated were
disaggregated into the number of passengers and the net cash flow “per passenger”. Their
model is thus based on the existence of two stochastic variables, but they considered the
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investment costs constant.
4.1.3 Two-Factor Uncertainty Models in the Real Options Literature
All of the above research pieces do not consider the two key-value drivers of a BOT project -
the construction costs and cash flows to be generated by operations - as stochastic variables.
To the best of our knowledge, the only research piece based on a two-factor uncertainty
model, in the context of BOT projects, where the stochastic variables are the present value
of the cash flows and the construction costs is the paper by Ho and Liu (2002). In fact,
these researchers considered the construction costs and the present value of cash flows as be-
ing both stochastic variables, behaving according to geometric Brownian motions. However,
their model is designed in discrete-time, more specifically applying the well-known binomial
model, with the purpose of valuing a debt guarantee given by the government, and also ac-
counting for the risk of bankruptcy. The model we propose and describe in Section 4.3 is
a two-factor uncertainty model in continuous-time where both construction costs and cash
flows follow geometric Brownian motions that are possibly correlated and, to the best of our
knowledge, is the first model based on a two-factor uncertainty approach in continuous-time,
in the context of BOT projects.
In fact, the consideration of both key-value drivers of BOT projects as stochastic variables
is not a common feature in the existing research. However, we should stress that, in recent
years, two-factor uncertainty models have been increasingly adopted to address other research
topics in the field of real options, such as the research pieces carried out by Armada et al.
(2013), Adkins and Paxson (2011) and Paxson and Pinto (2005)
The traditional real options model on the optimal timing to invest in a project with irre-
versible costs and generating perpetual cash flows was first developed by McDonald and
Siegel (1986), where both the present value of the cash flows and the investment costs are
considered to behave stochastically. This model is carefully explained in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). These authors describe the model but held the investment costs constant in a first
stage. Later in their text book, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) address the bi-dimensionality issue
- thus recognizing the stochastic nature of the investment costs - and present McDonald and
Siegel (1986) solution, which consists of reducing the two stochastic variables to just one, by
merely substituting the cash flows and investment costs by a single variable (ratio) that equals
the cash flows divided by the investment costs. McDonald and Siegel (1986) model is also
described in Trigeorgis (1996). Both Trigeorgis (1996) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) stated
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that it is optimal to invest when the ratio between the cash flows and the investment costs
reaches a given boundary: the so-called “free boundary”, separating the waiting region from
the investing region. This method may be very useful to address some BOT projects related
issues but, unfortunately, we cannot apply it to all situations in the context of the present
work, since we can not invoke homogeneity of degree one in all the boundary conditions,
unlike what happens in McDonald and Siegel (1986) model.4
The model we suggest in the present Chapter is based on the existence of uncertainty in
both the facility construction costs and in the value of the cash flows that will be generated
by operating the project facility. Hence, a two-factor uncertainty approach is adopted, with
both variables following geometric Brownian motions that are possibly correlated. In the
next Section, we detail the proposed framework where the government grants leeway to the
selected firm regarding the timing for project implementation, which means that the private
firm may implement the project when he or she decides that is optimal to do so. However,
we suggest that a contractual penalty should be enforced in the event the private firm does
not implement the project immediately. The theoretical model we propose aims to determine
the optimal level for this contractual penalty and will consider the argument that the selected
firm is more efficient than the government in executing the project facility and also that the
government recognizes the existence of social costs, i.e., the costs that correspond to the
loss of social welfare which emerge if the project is not implemented immediately. If both
entities are equally efficient, then the optimal penalty would be the one that would induce the
selected firm to invest in the same moment the government would, if the government decided
to undertake the project. However, we will demonstrate that - by assuming that the private
firm is more efficient than the government in executing the project facility - the optimal
contractual penalty is the one that makes the private firm invest when his or her value for the
cash flows trigger equals the value of the government cash flows trigger, for a given project
dimension and assuming a specific level of comparative efficiency. In fact, by considering
that the private firm is more efficient, then one expects the private firm to invest sooner than
the government would since he or she will attain his or her construction costs trigger sooner
than the government will attain its construction costs trigger. By attaining the construction
costs trigger sooner than the government and since the optimal contractual penalty is the one
that makes both entities have the same trigger for the cash flows, then one expects the private
firm to invest sooner than the government would, if the government decided to conduct the
4Since their boundary conditions do not infringe homogeneity of degree one, the model proposed by these
researchers respect the condition which states that the sum of the roots is equal to 1. A closed-form solution is
thus reached.
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project. In fact, by introducing the higher efficiency of the private firm in the model, we
can not define the optimal penalty as being the one that makes both entities have the same
combination of triggers, i.e., expectedly, to invest in same moment of time. Rather, in the
presence of the private firm’s greater efficiency, the optimal penalty should be defined as the
one that moves the private firm cash flows trigger downwards in order to meet the government
cash flows trigger, for a given project dimension and considering the estimated value for the
comparative efficiency factor.
4.2 Proposed Framework
4.2.1 Flexibility May Imply a Cost. The Contractual Penalty
We define a conceptual framework where a BOT project may be undertaken by the govern-
ment or awarded to a private firm through an appropriate competitive bid process, maybe
because the government recognizes that is less efficient than the private firm in conducting
the project. We suggest that the project may be initiated whenever the selected bidder decides
it is optimal to do so, meaning that no contractual obligation for immediate initiation of activ-
ities is imposed by the government. This assumption regarding the absence of any contractual
obligation regarding the immediate implementation of the project has also been adopted by
Armada et al. (2012), and plays a crucial role in the context of the research questions they
address. The motivation of their research work lies on the argument that the private firm will
start investing later than the government would like to, since the option to defer the project
implementation does have value. Bearing this in mind, they studied how certain subsidies
and guarantees, granted to the private firm, can be optimally arranged with the purpose of
inducing the immediate implementation of the project. We build the present framework on
the same assumption but argue that, under certain conditions, a legal penalty should be en-
forced in the event the construction of the facility does not start immediately. Thus, and even
though we acknowledge that the private firm may manage the project implementation as far
as its initiation/completion is concerned, we suggest that a penalty should be enforced in the
case the infrastructure is not ready and operations do not start immediately. This means that
the private firm is aware of the fact that delaying the project implementation may grant him
or her some benefits (there is value to waiting for more information) but is also aware that
deferring the beginning of the project may entail a cost. Thus, the private firm has flexibility
regarding the moment to start running operations but this flexibility may imply a cost. We
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propose that, under certain conditions, which we will explain in this Section, this cost should
be considered in the contract form, assuming the form of a legal penalty.
4.2.2 The Comparative Efficiency Factor
We have to acknowledge that governments are, in most cases, less efficient than private firms
in conducting BOT projects. This argument is common in the literature and is frequently
invoked as being one of the reasons why governments actually grant the projects to the private
sector (see, for example, Brandao and Saraiva (2008); Zhang and Kumaraswamy (2001)).
Being so, one should expect the private firm to invest earlier due to its greater efficiency. To
be more efficient means being able to construct the facility investing less money than the
government would. Hence, if the expected constructions costs of the private firm are lower
than the construction costs estimated by the government, then - all else equal - the private
firm will attain the critical value for the cash flows to be generated by operations that triggers
the investment sooner than the government. This is the same as saying that one expects the
private firm to invest in an earlier moment of time than the government would.
Hence, by considering that the private firm is more efficient than the government, we are
assuming that the private firm will have a lower trigger for his or her construction costs than
if both entities were considered to be equally efficient because, if both entities were equally
efficient, then they would have the same construction costs trigger. This greater efficiency
leads us to conclude that the efficiency factor places the firm construction costs trigger before
the government construction costs trigger, “vis-a-vis” with the scenario where both entities
are equally efficient. Furthermore, the greater the level of comparative efficiency, the lower
the private firm construction costs trigger will be or, which is the same, the further backwards
its construction costs trigger will be shifted, again when compared with the “equally efficient
scenario”.
Considering the private firm’s greater efficiency, the government’s purpose is accomplished
if the private firm invests when his or her cash flows trigger equals the government cash flows
trigger. We would like to underline this argument: by enforcing an optimal legal penalty, the
government’s purpose is to induce the private firm to invest when he or she attains a cash
flows trigger whose value equals the value of the government cash flows trigger. This implies
that, without the enforcement of the legal penalty, the private firm cash flows trigger may have
a higher value than the government cash flows trigger. We will show under which conditions
this inequality holds. One of these conditions derives from the fact that the government cash
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flows trigger is affected by another element that the suggested model considers. We designate
this element as “social costs”.
4.2.3 Social Costs
The traditional concept of “social cost” was addressed by Coase (1960) and is based on the
concept of “externality”, in the sense that, by producing a certain good, a harmful effect
is caused to the society, rather than the owners of the firm responsible for the production
of that good or its customers. It is a cost which society must ultimately bear. This naturally
implies that a loss of welfare to the population emerges due to the existence of this externality.
Hence, this loss of welfare is not a direct consequence of the fact that a firm is not producing
a good or providing a service to the customers. Rather, social cost is exactly defined as
being the cost borne by the population because a certain good is being produced and such
fact causes an undesirable effect to the population. Notwithstanding, we reason that, when a
government or a public entity decides to implement a project, its goal is to provide a service
to the population. The government decision of, say, implementing a High-Speed Rail service
is based on the conviction that the project will generate a social benefit, as stated by Rus
and Nombela (2007). Hence, the government believes that social benefits occur as soon as
the project is implemented and operations start because social welfare will emerge once the
project is completed. Bearing this important argument in mind, we state that, on the contrary,
if the project is not immediately implemented, a loss of welfare occurs and this is the same
as stating that the social benefits emerging from the immediate project implementation are
postponed until the project is actually completed and the subsequent activities start. We thus
argue that the lack of social benefits from the moment the project should have been ready
and the moment the project is, in fact, ready and operations begin can be legitimately defined
as “social costs”.5 Social costs are, therefore, directly related with the loss of welfare that
emerges if the project is not implemented immediately. Again, these costs correspond to
the loss of social welfare occurred from the time the project should have been ready to start
operating and providing services to its users and the moment operations actually begin and
the users needs start being satisfied. Being so, our model considers the existence of social
costs in the case the project is not promptly implemented.
5We would like to underline the argument that our definition of “social costs” differs from the definition of
“social cost”, as in Coase (1960). This means that we are not using this concept in the context of the present
work because we are not considering the importance of the emergence of social cost, which results from some
kind of externality.
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Social costs, as we define them, are rarely negligible. BOT projects are undertaken because
governments believe that public needs must be satisfied and such needs will only be satisfied
once the project is completed and subsequent operations begin. The level of social costs
may be high for some projects, moderate for other projects or even low in fewer cases.6
We will consider that social costs are estimated by the government as being a percentage of
the expected cash flows to be generated by operations. By estimating an expected level of
social costs, the government is setting its own cash flows trigger or, which is the same, is
defining the optimal moment where the project would be initiated if the government decided
to undertake the project. Nevertheless, when defining the moment where the project would
be implemented, the government behaves as a rational agent, in the sense that also considers
the benefits of waiting and invest in a later date (meaning that the government recognizes that
there is value to waiting, regardless of which entity will conduct the project) and compares
such benefits with the fact that, the later the project is implemented, the higher the value of
social costs. Thus, when the government sets its own cash flows trigger, by defining the level
of social costs considered to be tolerable, the government takes into account the fact that
waiting for better information does have value. The government cash flows trigger will thus
result from a trade-off between the benefits of waiting and, hence, not invest immediately
and the level of social costs to be borne by the population, if the project is not promptly
initiated. Being so, when establishing the level of social costs considered to be acceptable,
the government also takes into account the benefits that derive from delaying the project
implementation. Consequently, the greater the level of social costs the government considers
to be acceptable, the sooner the government would invest. On the contrary, for lower levels
of acceptable social costs, the government will invest later. We will numerically demonstrate
the existence of this relationship in Section 4.3.
4.2.4 The Optimal Value for the Contractual Penalty
Social costs do play a fundamental role in establishing the optimal value for the contractual
penalty to be enforced in the event the project is not immediately implemented. The greater
the level of social costs the sooner the government would invest and the higher the optimal
penalty needs to be, with the purpose of moving the cash flows trigger downwards to meet the
6Currently in Portugal, there is a stream of opinion that questions the benefits of some large-scale investments
undertaken in the recent past, especially the construction of highways linking the cities of Lisbon and Porto,
which are considered by many to be redundant. In such cases and following this line of thought, delaying the
initiation of large-scale investments whose social benefits are perceived as being very low will entail a very low
level of social costs.
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government cash flows trigger, which is now placed more below. On the contrary, the lower
the level of social costs the smaller the optimal penalty needs to be (since the government
cash flows trigger is now placed more above) and, if the level of social costs is zero, then a
legal penalty is not needed, which is the same as saying that the optimal value is zero. Hence,
the optimal value for the contractual penalty is the one that moves the private firm cash flows
trigger downwards with the purpose of perfectly meeting the government cash flows trigger,
assuming that the private firm cash flows trigger is greater than the government cash flows
trigger. Bearing this definition in mind, we have to conclude that any value for the contractual
penalty that does not move the private firm cash flows trigger downwards in order to perfectly
meet the government cash flows trigger will never be optimal. In Section 4.4, we will discuss
the effects, to the government, that derive from including a non-optimal value for the legal
penalty in the contract form.
The remainder of the present Chapter unfolds as follows. In Section 4.3, the model is de-
scribed and both the government decision to invest and the government expectation about the
private firm decision to invest are presented. The optimal level for the contractual penalty
“per unit” of cost is then reached, considering the effect of the estimated efficiency factor
and also the effect caused by the level of social costs. We proceed to perform a sensitivity
analysis, aiming to assess the impact of variations in various parameters of the model on the
optimal contractual penalty. More specifically, we measure how the optimal value for the
contractual penalty is affected by (i) changes in the level of social costs; (ii) changes in the
efficiency factor; (iii) variations in both the level of social costs and the level of the com-
parative efficiency factor. Furthermore, we derive the analytical solution to the level of the
efficiency factor above which the inclusion of legal penalty is not justified, for a given level
of social costs. The same solution also enables us to determine the level of social costs, for
a given comparative efficiency factor, above which a contractual penalty should be enforced.
Still in Section 4.3, we assess the impact of changes in the correlation coefficients and in the
standard deviations of both variables. In Section 4.4, we use a numerical example in order
to demonstrate the effects, to the government, of including a non-optimal value for the legal
penalty in the contract from, as a result of overestimating or underestimating the comparative
efficiency factor. Finally, in Section 4.5, concluding remarks are given.
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4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Assumptions
We assume that (i) the government or other public entities have the necessary know-how
to determine fair estimates about the construction costs and the cash flows to be generated
through operating the facility, as if the project was conducted by the government; (ii) the
standard deviations of the facility construction costs and of the future cash flows are the same
for both entities since variations in the value of the project inputs and the project outputs are
both observable in the market; (iii) the rate of return-shortfalls (i.e., the “convenience yields”)
are also the same for both entities; (iv) the government recognizes that is less efficient in con-
structing the project facility than the private firm; (v) the government is able to determine an
estimate for the private firm’s greater level of efficiency; (vi) the construction of the facility
is instantaneous;7 (vii) the project, once implemented, will generate perpetual cash flows;8
(viii) the government acknowledges the emergence of social costs if the project is not com-
pleted and operations do not start immediately; (ix) social costs are estimated as a percentage
of the present value of the cash flows to be generated by operations; (x) the project dimension
is given by the expected amount of construction costs estimated by the government.
4.3.2 Model Description
4.3.2.1 Introduction
We depart from considering that the various sources of uncertainty underlying a BOT project
may be reduced to two aggregated sources: the uncertainty regarding the value of the future
cash flows to be generated by operations, V , and the facility construction costs, K. In specific
situations, we will follow Adkins and Paxson (2011) approach, also based on a two-factor un-
certainty model, and consisting of a set of simultaneous equations. These authors developed
a quasi-analytical solution, whereby a boundary between the continuance and the renewal
7By assuming that the construction of the facility is instantaneous, we are implicitly considering that no
flexibility is present throughout the construction period. Therefore, we exclude the existence of options during
this stage. Since flexibility is not considered, we are only concerned with the fact that construction costs are
uncertain.
8We assume that the concession period is sufficiently long for the investment opportunity to be considered
equivalent to a perpetual call option. This is a common assumption in the literature. See, for example, Armada
et al. (2012).
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regions (i.e., the boundary separating the regions where values for both variables justify an
incumbent asset to continue operating or to be renewed and, thus, substituted by a new one by
paying a fixed cost) is determined, since they are unable to invoke homogeneity of degree one
in the boundary conditions. Likewise, some of the questions we propose to answer can not
be addressed by invoking homogeneity of degree one, hence leading us to follow Adkins and
Paxson (2011) approach. By considering that a trade-off between the two stochastic variables
is present and also that only when both triggers are simultaneously attained the investment
is triggered, Adkins and Paxson (2011) state that a countless set of pairs for the triggers do
exist, which means that there is an infinite combination of possible threshold values for both
variables. In our model, it is possible to envisage a countless set of pairs of threshold values
for the stochastic variables, V ∗ and K∗ and also that this countless set of pairs defines the
discriminatory boundary separating the waiting region from the investing region. A variation
in one of the variables leads to a variation of the same sign in the other for the investment
to be triggered. In fact, a lower value for the construction costs trigger will necessarily lead
to a lower value for the cash flows to trigger the investment and, similarly, a higher value
for the construction costs trigger will lead to a higher cash flows trigger value in order to
prompt the investment. As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) point out, the value of the option to
invest depends on both variables, meaning that one would expect the option to be exercised
when V becomes sufficiently high for a given K or K becomes sufficiently low for a given
V . On the contrary, if V is not sufficiently high for a given K or K is too low for a given V,
then one would expect the option to be held. Hence, we are aware that is possible to define
an optimal boundary composed by a set of pairs for V ∗ and K∗ that discriminates the waiting
region from the investing region. We will denote these pairs of trigger values as {V ∗,K∗}.
In the present Section, we proceed to present the base case parameter values and derive the
government decision to invest, bearing in mind that social costs are present and considered
to be a percentage of the cash flows to be generated by operations. This implies that the
government recognizes the fact that, if the project is not immediately implemented, a loss of
social welfare occurs until the project is completed and operations actually start. We then
derive the government expectation about the private firm investment decision, assuming the
private firm is more efficient than the government in executing the project facility. Finally,
we determine the optimal value for the contractual penalty “per unit” of cost, and consider
three different project dimensions, for illustrative purposes.
For both cases, i.e., the government decision to invest and the expectation the government
has about the private firm’s decision to invest, the two stochastic variables (the value of the
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cash flows to be generated by operations, V , and the facility construction costs, K) follow
geometric Brownian motions that are possibly correlated. Let i ∈ {G,P}, where G stands for
government and P stands for the government expectation about the private firm. Being so:
dVi = αViVidt+σViVidzVi (4.1)
dKi = αKiKidt+σKiKidzKi (4.2)
E(dzVi,dzKi) = ρidt (4.3)
where αVi and αKi are the drift parameters, dt is the time interval, σVi and σKi the standard
deviations for each of the variables, dzVi and dzKi the corresponding increments of standard
Wiener processes and, finally, ρi is the correlation coefficient between Vi and Ki.
Table 4.1 includes the base case parameter values we will be using, unless otherwise men-
tioned.
Table 4.1: the base case parameter values
(for i ∈{G,P})
Parameters Symbols Values
standard deviation of the cash flows σVi 0.15
standard deviation of the construction costs σKi 0.10
cash flows rate of return-shortfall δVi 0.03
construction costs rate of return-shortfall δKi 0.03
correlation coefficient ρi 0
risk-free interest rate r 0.05
level of social costs s 0.02
comparative efficiency factor γ 0.2
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4.3.2.2 The Government Decision to Invest
Under risk-neutrality, the value of the government investment opportunity, FG(VG,KG) must
satisfy the following partial differential equation (Constantinides, 1978):
1
2
σ2VGV
2
G
∂ 2FG
∂V 2G
+
1
2
σ2KGK
2
G
∂ 2FG
∂K2G
+ρσVGσKGVGKG
∂ 2FG
∂VG∂KG
+
(r−δVG)VG
∂FG
∂VG
+(r−δKG)KG
∂FG
∂KG
− rFG− sVG =0 (4.4)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, sVG denotes the value of social costs as a percentage
of the cash flows to be generated by the project operations, δVG and δKG are the rates of
return-shortfall for VG and KG, respectively, which are given by the following equations:
δVG = r−αVG (4.5)
δKG = r−αKG (4.6)
The following general solution satisfies the partial differential equation (4.4):
FG(VG,KG) = A1V
β+
G K
η+
G +A2V
β+
G K
η−
G +A3V
β−
G K
η+
G +A4V
β−
G K
η−
G −
s
δVG
VG (4.7)
where A1, A2, A3 and A4 are constants that need to be determined. β+, β−, η+ and η− are
the four roots of an elliptical equation, which is the two-factor counterpart of the one-factor
stochastic model quadratic equation presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The elliptical
equation is:
Q(β ,η) =
1
2
σ2VGβ (β −1)+
1
2
σ2KGη(η−1)+
ρGσVGσKGβη+(r−δVG)β +(r−δKG)η− r = 0 (4.8)
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The function Q(β ,η) = 0 defines an ellipse.9 Equation (4.8) has four quadrants, to which of
them corresponds a pair of the four roots just mentioned, i.e., the four points where the ellip-
tic function meets the axes. If we now consider the absorbing barriers FG(0,0), FG(0,KG),
thus A3 = A4 = 0, since the option to invest is worthless if the present value of future cash
flows is zero. Likewise, for FG(VG,KG), and as KG becomes infinitely large for any value
of VG, then the option is also worthless. To respect this condition, we need to set constant
A1 = 0, leaving only constant A2 6= 0. Thus, in our case, the quadrant of interest is the second
one, corresponding to the pair of roots {β+,η−}. The general solution for the homogeneous
partial differential equation (4.4), given by equation (4.7) is thus reduced and takes the fol-
lowing form:
FG(VG,KG) = A2V
β+
G K
η−
G −
s
δVG
VG (4.9)
The value matching condition implies that, when the trigger values for both VG and KG are
simultaneously attained, the value of the option to invest must equal the project’s expected
Net Present Value (NPV). Being so:
FG(V ∗G,K
∗
G) = A2V
∗β+
G K
∗η−
G − sδVG V
∗
G =V
∗
G−K∗G (4.10)
As the value-matching condition supports homogeneity of degree one on both sides of the
equation, we can reduce the dimensionality of the problem to only one variable, since β++
η− = 1. Thus, the trigger value for V ∗G will be given by the following equation:
10
V ∗G =
β
β −1
K∗G
(1+ sδVG
)
(4.11)
where β is the root of the fundamental quadratic equation (4.12), whose value exceeds one.11
9Please refer to Adkins and Paxson (2011) for more details.
10Please note that, in the absence of social costs, the solution given by equation (4.11) is reduced to the one
presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the case of two stochastic variables.
11Please refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for further details.
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Q =
1
2
(σ2VG−2ρσVGσKG +σ2KG)β (β −1)+(δKG−δVG)β −δKG = 0 (4.12)
Equation (4.11) leads us to conclude that there is a countless pairs of government triggers,{
K∗G,V
∗
G
}
whose values depend on the value of the root β , on the level of social costs esti-
mated by the government, s and on cash flows rate of return-shortfall, δVG . A discriminatory
boundary does exist, separating the waiting region from the investing region, provided that
we stipulate a set of values for K∗G or a set of values for V
∗
G. By setting a value for one of the
two triggers, we reach the value of the other trigger by merely applying equation (4.11) for a
given level of social costs.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the government discriminatory boundary, separating the waiting region
from the investing region. We considered a set of pairs,
{
K∗G;V
∗
G
}
, with K∗G ranging from 100
to 300. The base case parameter values included in Table 4.1 apply.
Figure 4.1: the government discriminatory boundary
The discriminatory boundary in Figure 4.1 has a constant and positive slope (which is given
by: β(β−1)(1+ sδVG
)) and, thus, the relationship between the two variables is linear. An increase
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(decrease) in K∗G of, say, 10%, will lead to an increase (decrease) of 10% in the value of the
cash flows for the investment to be triggered. The existence of this relationship means that a
trade-off between the cash flows trigger and the construction costs trigger is present. As Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) stated, when one of the two triggers is affected by a (negative) positive
variation, the other variable needs to respond with a (negative) positive variation of the same
dimension in order to trigger the investment.
4.3.2.3 The Government Expectation about the Private Firm Investment Decision
We have been assuming that the private firm is more efficient than the government in con-
structing the project facility. Being so, let γ denote the comparative efficiency factor. We can
relate the government construction costs with the expectation the government has about the
private firm construction costs applying the following equation:
KP = KG(1− γ) (4.13)
We now proceed to compute the trigger values of the private firm as estimated by the gov-
ernment. The firm may face a penalty cost, which we denote by c, for delaying the project
implementation. Let FP(VP,KP) denote the government expectation about the value of the
private firm investment opportunity. Under risk-neutrality, FP(VP,KP) must satisfy the fol-
lowing partial differential equation:
1
2
σ2VPV
2
P
∂ 2FP
∂V 2P
+
1
2
σ2KPK
2
P
∂ 2FP
∂K2P
+ρPσVPσKPVPKP
∂ 2FP
∂VP∂KP
+
(r−δVP)VP
∂FP
∂VP
+(r−δKP)KP
∂FP
∂KP
− rFP− c = 0 (4.14)
Equation (4.14) has a non-homogeneous part, c and the rest of the equation is homogeneous.
We reach the general solution for the homogeneous part of the partial differential equation
(4.14) by applying the same reasoning as in the previous case, i.e., the government deci-
sion to invest. Being so, the general solution for the homogeneous part of equation (4.14),
FHP (VP,KP) takes the form:
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FHP (VP,KP) = A5V
β+
P K
η+
P +A6V
β+
P K
η−
P +A7V
β−
P K
η+
P +A8V
β−
P K
η−
P (4.15)
As in the previous case, we are only interested in the pair of roots {β+,η−}, which simplifies
the solution given by equation (4.15). Hence, we reach a reduced solution, given by the
following equation:
FHP (VP,KP) = A6V
β+
P K
η−
P (4.16)
The particular solution for the non-homogeneous part, FNHP is as follows:
FNHP = −
c
r
(4.17)
Stitching together the homogeneous and non-homogeneous solutions, we obtain the follow-
ing expression that satisfies the whole partial differential equation (4.14):
FHP (VP,KP)+F
NH
P = FP(VP,KP) = A6V
β+
P K
η−
P −
c
r
(4.18)
The value-matching condition, in these circumstances, is given by:
FP(V ∗P ,K
∗
P) = A6V
∗β+
P K
∗η−
P −
c
r
=V ∗P −K∗P (4.19)
Unfortunately, this value-matching condition does not support homogeneity of degree one
on both sides, which means that β++ η− 6=1. To overcome this problem, we follow Adkins
and Paxson (2011) quasi-analytical approach by constructing a set of three simultaneous
equations. The first equation is the elliptical equation (4.20), which is equivalent to equation
(4.8):
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Q(β ,η) =
1
2
σ2VPβ (β −1)+
1
2
σ2KPη(η−1)+
ρσVPσKPβη+(r−δVP)β +(r−δKP)η− r = 0 (4.20)
The other two equations are the two smooth-pasting conditions derived from the value-
matching condition, given by equation (4.19).
The first smooth-pasting condition is the first-order derivative of the value-matching condi-
tion, in respect to V ∗P . After some rearrangements, we obtain the first smooth-pasting condi-
tion, given by the following equation:
β+(V ∗P −K∗P+
c
r
) = V ∗P (4.21)
The second smooth-pasting condition is the first-order derivative of the value matching con-
dition, given by equation (4.19), in respect to K∗P. Likewise, after some rearrangements, we
reach the second smooth-pasting condition, given by equation (4.22):
η−(V ∗P −K∗P+
c
r
) = −K∗P (4.22)
Equations (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22) form the set of simultaneous equations which will enable
us to define the private firm discriminatory boundary, composed by a set of countless pairs
{K∗P,V ∗P} and, therefore, to obtain the private firm’s waiting and investing regions in the
presence of a given value for the contractual penalty, c. For this purpose - since we face the
existence of four unknowns, V ∗P ,K∗P,β+,η− and we only have three equations available - we
follow Adkins and Paxson (2011) solution in order to determine the four unknowns. Thus,
we first need to set K∗P and determine the corresponding, β+,η−and V ∗P . Then, by perturbing
K∗P and repeating the process, we gather a set of pairs {K∗P,V ∗P} that define the private firm
discriminatory boundary.
4.3.2.4 Determining the Optimal Value for the Contractual Penalty
In order to reach the optimal value for the contractual penalty, we will first consider that c= 0,
i.e., we will determine the private firm cash flows trigger as if no legal penalty was enforced.
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We will use the set of three simultaneous equations formed by equations (4.20), (4.21) and
(4.22) for this purpose. This enables us to obtain new values for V ∗P , after perturbing K∗P.12
Thus, by applying this procedure, we determine the private firm cash flows trigger, for a given
K∗P, as if no penalty was enforced. We will designate, from now on, this cash flows trigger
as V+P and the corresponding construction costs trigger as K
+
P .
13 Hence, V+P represents the
private firm cash flows trigger that needs to be moved downwards in order to perfectly meet
the government cash flows trigger, V ∗G, for any given K
+
P .
14 Secondly, we follow Adkins and
Paxson (2011) approach and use the set of three simultaneous equations formed by equations
(4.20), (4.21) and (4.22) with the purpose of determining the exact value for c that moves
V+P downwards to perfectly meet V
∗
G.
15 The value of c that perfectly moves V+P downwards
in order to meet V ∗G is the optimal value for the contractual penalty. Hence, the optimal
contractual penalty is the one that makes V ∗P = V ∗G for a given K
∗
P or, which is the same, the
one that perfectly aligns both cash flows triggers. We designate the optimal value for the
contractual penalty as c∗.
The following table exhibits a set of representative values for K∗G, V
∗
G, K
∗
P, V
+
P , c
∗ and V ∗P .
The values were obtained applying the procedures previously described. We consider three
possible project dimensions, given by K∗G = 100, K
∗
G = 200 and K
∗
G = 300.
Table 4.2: representative values for the government triggers, the private firm triggers and the
optimal contractual penalty, for three project dimensions
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05; s = 0.02; γ = 0.2)
K∗G K
∗
P V
∗
G V
+
P c
∗ V ∗P c∗/K∗G c∗/K∗P
100 80 123 164 0.9611 123 0.0096 0.012
200 160 247 329 1.9222 247 0.0096 0.012
300 240 370 493 2.8833 370 0.0096 0.012
The results included in Table 4.2 clearly show that the level of the optimal contractual penalty,
c∗ is proportional to the level of K∗G and, consequently, also proportional to the level of K
∗
P.
12Perturbing K∗P does not change the value of the roots, β+, η− since we are considering, at this stage, that
c = 0. Thus, β++η− = 1, for any K∗P.
13K+P = K
∗
P, as we are fixing K
∗
P to obtain V
+
P .
14Considering that V+P is greater than V
∗
G, otherwise there would be no need for a legal penalty to be included
in the contract.
15As we will demonstrate, this does not mean that the new discriminatory boundary for the private firm
overlaps the government discriminatory boundary.
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This means that no scale-effect is present in the model: an increase (decrease) in the con-
struction costs trigger will lead to an increase (decrease) in the value of the optimal legal
penalty of the same magnitude. This proportionality feature allows us to determine the level
of the optimal contractual penalty “per unit” of the private firm’s expected construction costs
which, according to the inputs considered, equals approximately 0.012.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the impact of the optimal contractual penalty on the private firm dis-
criminatory boundary. The government discriminatory boundary, formed by pairs {K∗G;V ∗G}
is presented again. The private firm discriminatory boundary before considering the impact
of the contractual penalty, formed by pairs {K+P ;V+P } and the private firm discriminatory
boundary, formed by pairs {K∗P;V ∗P} - which results from considering the impact of the opti-
mal contractual penalty “per unit” of the private firm expected construction costs - are both
designed, for the three project dimensions.
Figure 4.2: the impact of the optimal contractual penalty on the private firm discriminatory
boundary
Figure 4.2 shows the private firm pair of triggers before considering the impact of the opti-
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mal legal penalty, for the three dimensions. If no legal penalty was enforced in the contract,
the government would expect the private firm to have a discriminatory boundary formed by
a countless set of trigger pairs, {K+P ;V+P } represented by a countless set of points (A1 =
{80;164}, A2 = {160;329} and A3 = {240;493} are three examples of those points). Solv-
ing the system of simultaneous equations composed by equations (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22),
we have reached the three points B1 = {80;123}, B2 = {160;247} and B3 = {240;370}. By
joining these three points, we define another discriminatory boundary: the private firm dis-
criminatory boundary after considering the impact of the optimal contractual penalty, formed
by pairs {K∗P;V ∗P}. In fact, points B1, B2 and B3 are three of a countless set of points represent-
ing a countless set of pairs, {K∗P;V ∗P}, which define the private firm discriminatory boundary
after considering the impact of the contractual penalty. Figure 4.2 also shows that the pri-
vate firm discriminatory boundary does not match the government discriminatory boundary.
In fact, as we have argued, the optimal penalty for each project dimension, c∗1, c
∗
2 and c
∗
3 is
the one that moves the private firm cash flows trigger downwards in order to perfectly meet
the government cash flows trigger. This is exactly the effect that each of the optimal val-
ues for the contractual penalty produce and this effect is represented in Figure 4.2 by three
arrows, one for each project dimension. It is visible that the greater the project dimension
the greater the size of the corresponding arrow, hence reflecting that a higher contractual
penalty is needed as we consider greater project dimensions. The private firm discriminatory
boundary, formed by pairs {K∗P;V ∗P} is then situated between the private firm discriminatory
boundary before considering the impact of the contractual penalty, formed by pairs {K+P ;V+P }
and the government discriminatory boundary, formed by pairs {K∗G;V ∗G}.16
Figure 4.2 also includes a specific point, which we designate as X . This point is situated
where the private firm discriminatory boundary, after considering the impact of the optimal
legal penalty (the one composed by pairs {K∗P;V ∗P}), intersects the line for the government
cash flows trigger on the second dimension, i.e., V ∗G = 247. To this project dimension, the gov-
ernment cash flows trigger and private firm cash flows trigger are both equal to 247 and, to that
cash flows trigger value, corresponds a private firm construction costs trigger of K∗P = 120.
Hence, considering the second dimension, given by K∗G = 200, the private firm construction
costs trigger, K∗P = 120 when the comparative efficiency factor, γ = 0.4. This means that, if
the comparative efficiency factor is equal or greater than 0.4, there is no need to include a
legal penalty in the contract form because the efficiency factor - for a level of social costs
16The private firm discriminatory boundary, after considering the impact of the optimal legal penalty, would
only match the government discriminatory boundary if the government assumed both entities to be equally
efficient, i.e., if γ = 0.
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equal to 0.02 - is strong enough to move the private firm cash flows trigger downwards in
order to perfectly meet the government cash flows trigger.
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
4.3.3.1 The Impact of Variations in the Level of Social Costs
Table 4.3 includes a set of values for the level of social costs and their impact on the gov-
ernment cash flows trigger and on the optimal contractual penalty, assuming that the project
dimension is given by K∗G = 200.
Table 4.3: sensitivity analysis: the impact of variations in the level of social costs
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05; γ = 0.2)
K∗G K
∗
P s V
∗
G c∗ V+P V ∗P
200 160 0.00 411 0.0000 329 329
200 160 0.0075 329 0.0000 329 329
200 160 0.01 308 0.4732 329 308
200 160 0.02 247 1.9222 329 247
200 160 0.03 206 2.9235 329 206
200 160 0.04 176 3.6661 329 176
Given a comparative efficiency factor, γ = 0.2, for values of s ≤ 0.0075 there is no need to
enforce a legal penalty because the private firm cash flows trigger is lower than (or equal to)
the government cash flows trigger. For s > 0.0075, the higher the level of social costs the
more below the government cash flows trigger is situated, which means that the difference
between the private firm cash flows trigger and the government cash flows trigger becomes
greater. Consequently, a stronger contractual penalty is needed in order to perfectly align the
two triggers. This also implies that there is a specific level of social costs that makes both cash
flows triggers have the same value, before considering the effect of any contractual penalty.
Such level of social costs is, therefore, the threshold value below which the inclusion of a
contractual penalty is not necessary. We can derive an analytical solution to determine this
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threshold value, which we designate as s¯. Thus, s¯ will be given by the following equation:17
s =
γδVP
1− γ (4.23)
As we are departing from equal values to the parameters that influence the value of β , both for
the government and the private firm, we have reached a solution for s¯, which is independent
of β and merely depends on the private firm cash flows rate of return-shortfall, δVP and on
the level of the efficiency factor, γ . Considering the inputs used in our numerical example,
s¯ = 0.0075. Therefore, this is the level of social costs that makes both cash flows triggers
have the same value, as the results included in Table 4.3 reflect.
4.3.3.2 The Impact of Variations in the Level of the Efficiency Factor
Table 4.4 includes a set of different values for the comparative efficiency factor and the impact
produced on the optimal contractual penalty, considering that the project dimension is given
by K∗G = 200.
17In the absence of social costs, considering greater levels for the comparative efficiency factor merely re-
sults in lower construction costs triggers for the private firm and, hence, lower cash flows triggers of the same
magnitude. This implies that considering higher (lower) efficiency factors when social costs are absent only
leads the private firm pair of triggers to be situated more backwards (forward) in the government discriminatory
boundary. In these circumstances, the private firm discriminatory boundary and the government discriminatory
boundary overlap each other, which means that no penalty is needed, regardless of the level of comparative
efficiency.
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Table 4.4: sensitivity analysis: the impact of variations in the level of the efficiency factor
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05; s = 0.02)
γ K∗G K∗P V ∗G c∗ V+P V ∗P
0.0 200 200 247 3.9110 411 247
0.1 200 180 247 2.9087 370 247
0.2 200 160 247 1.9222 329 247
0.3 200 140 247 0.9523 288 247
0.4 200 120 247 0.0000 247 247
0.5 200 100 247 0.0000 206 206
The results included in Table 4.4 demonstrate that higher efficiency factors lead to lower
triggers for the private firm construction costs which, in turn, produce lower values for the
corresponding cash flows triggers, V+P . Therefore, as the comparative efficiency factor, γ
increases, the optimal contractual penalty, c∗, decreases, since both triggers are closer to each
other, until a value is reached for the comparative efficiency which, by itself, is strong enough
to align the two cash flows triggers. Hence, we conclude that, for given level of social costs,
there is a value for the efficiency factor above which there is no need to include a contractual
penalty in the contract form. In fact, we observed that Figure 4.2 includes the point X - whose
coordinates are {120;247}. This point corresponds to this level of comparative efficiency and
is situated where the private firm discriminatory boundary, before considering the effect of
the contractual penalty, intersects the government discriminatory boundary, for the project
dimension given by K∗G = 200. When the efficiency factor is greater than 0.4, the private firm
cash flows trigger is lower than the government cash flows trigger, meaning that there is no
need to include a legal penalty in the contract because the government’s purpose is already
accomplished. In such cases, the optimal contractual penalty is zero, as the results included
in Table 4.4 demonstrate.
In fact, the results included in Table 4.4 show that enforcing a legal penalty in the contract
only becomes necessary for levels of comparative efficiency lower than 0.4, considering a
level of social costs of 0.02. Similarly to what we did regarding the level of social costs,
we can determine the threshold value for the efficiency factor below which the inclusion of a
legal penalty in the contract form becomes necessary. Let γ¯ denote the level of comparative
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efficiency that align both cash flows triggers: this is the level below which a legal penalty
should be enforced. Being so, γ¯ will be given by the following equation:18
γ¯ =
s
s+δVP
(4.24)
4.3.3.3 The Combined Impact of Variations in the Level of Social Costs and in the
Level of the Efficiency Factor
We will now demonstrate how variations in the level of social costs, combined with variations
in the level of the comparative efficiency, affect the optimal value for the contractual penalty.
As shown in Table 4.3, the greater the level of social costs the lower the government cash
flows trigger. The government cash flows trigger is thus shifted downwards due to the exis-
tence of social costs, pressuring the government to invest sooner. However, we now have to
confront the government cash flows trigger, affected by different levels of social costs, with
the private firm cash flows trigger, affected by different levels of comparative efficiency. We
emphasize that the optimal value for the contractual penalty is the one that moves the private
firm cash flows trigger downwards with the purpose of perfectly meeting the government
cash flows trigger, for any dimension the project may assume.
Table 4.5: sensitivity analysis: the combined impact of variations in the level of social costs
and in the level of the efficiency factor
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05)
s = 0.01 s = 0.02 s = 0.03 s = 0.04 s = 0.05
γ = 0.1 1.4311 2.9087 3.9359 4.7014 5.2996
γ = 0.2 0.4734 1.9222 2.9235 3.6661 4.2443
γ = 0.3 0.0000 0.9523 1.9290 2.6494 3.2078
γ = 0.4 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 1.6535 2.1926
γ = 0.5 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.6802 1.2013
The values included in Table 4.5 are the optimal penalty values that result from considering
18Equation (4.24) is equivalent to equation (4.23), rewritten in terms of γ¯ .
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different combinations for the level of social costs and for the level of the comparative effi-
ciency. The results clearly illustrate what we have been arguing: the greater the level of social
costs the higher the value of the optimal legal penalty and, the higher the efficiency factor,
the lower the value of the optimal penalty. This means that a trade-off does exist between
the two factors. The effect caused by a positive (negative) variation in one of the factors may
be compensated by a negative (positive) variation in the other factor such that the optimal
contractual penalty remains unchanged, as the difference between the private firm cash flows
trigger and the government cash flows trigger remains the same.
The results included in Table 4.5 also show that when the comparative efficiency factor,
γ >0.4 and the level of social costs, s 6 0.03, there is no need to include a legal penalty in
the contract form because the combined effect of the two factors aligns the two cash flows
triggers. The same happens when γ = 0.3 and s= 0.01. This is the reason why, in such cases,
the optimal value for the contractual penalty included in Table 4.5 is zero.
4.3.3.4 The Impact of Variations in the Correlation Coefficients
We have been assuming that the correlation coefficients, ρG and ρP are zero and, hence, all
calculations were made assuming the absence of correlation between the facility construction
costs and the present value of cash flows to be generated from subsequent operations. Table
4.6 includes the results of the impact on the optimal contractual penalty caused by variations
in both correlation coefficients, ρG and ρP, assuming γ = 0.2 and s = 0.02. We should stress
that any change in ρG will cause the roots that are extracted from equation (4.8) to change
and, thus, V ∗G will also change. The impact on V
+
P is also presented. We set K
∗
G to 200 and the
conclusions are equivalent for any other level of K∗G since the results included in Table 4.2
demonstrate the existence of proportionality between this trigger and the optimal level for the
contractual penalty, c∗.19
19In order to confirm the existence of this proportionality, we set K∗G to 100 and reached optimal penalty
values, for all levels of ρ , half as great as the ones included in Table 4.6. These results confirm the existence of
proportionality between K∗G and c
∗.
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Table 4.6: the impact of variations in the correlation coefficients
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; r = 0.05; s = 0.02; γ = 0.2)
(ρG;ρP) (-1.0;-1.0) (-0.5;-0.5) (0.0;0.0) (0.5;0.5) (1.0;1.0)
K∗G 200 200 200 200 200
V ∗G 320 284 247 205 147
V+P 427 379 329 273 196
V ∗P 320 284 247 205 147
c∗ 2.3213 2.1295 1.9222 1.6791 1.1967
The results included in Table 4.6 show that one should expect that, as the correlation coeffi-
cients increase, from (−1.0;−1.0) to (1.0;1.0), the value of the optimal legal penalty would
decrease, since stronger positive (or less negative) correlations lead to lower cash flows trig-
ger values, both for the government and the private firm. In fact, it is expected that increasing
positive (or less decreasing negative) correlations would result in lower cash flows triggers for
both entities. Triggers will be closer to each other as positive (or less negative) correlations
become greater and the differences between the triggers become smaller. And, since the dif-
ference between the triggers becomes smaller, then a lower value for the contractual penalty
will be sufficient to perfectly align the triggers. On the contrary, higher negative correlations
(or lower positive correlations) will, expectedly, result in greater differences between the pri-
vate firm cash flows trigger - in the event that no penalty is enforced - and the government
cash flows trigger, meaning that, in these circumstances, a greater value for the legal penalty
will be needed in order to move the firm cash flows trigger downwards and perfectly align it
with the government cash flows trigger.
4.3.3.5 The Impact of Variations in the Standard Deviations
Table 4.7 illustrates how variations in both standard deviations affect the optimal contractual
penalty value. We consider variations in (σK;σV ) ranging from (0.05;0.05) to (0.30;0.30).
We should stress that any change considered in the volatility parameters will cause the roots
that are extracted from equation (4.8) to change and, thus, V ∗G will also change.
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Table 4.7: the impact of variations in the standard deviations
(for: K∗G= 200; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03;ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05; s = 0.02; γ = 0.2)
(σk;σV ) (0.05; 0.05) (0.10; 0.10) (0.15; 0.15) (0.20; 0.20) (0.25; 0.25) (0.30; 0.30)
V ∗G 160 212 278 360 459 575
V+P 213 283 371 480 611 767
c∗ 1.7889 2.0044 2.2350 2.4579 2.6631 2.8454
V ∗P 160 212 278 360 459 575
The results included in Table 4.7 show that higher volatility levels lead to higher values for
both the government cash flows trigger and the private firm cash flows trigger, as expected.
However, the difference between the private firm cash flows trigger before considering the
effect of the contractual penalty, V+P and the government cash flows trigger, V
∗
G is greater as
the volatility levels increase. This increasing difference between the two cash flows triggers
is explained by the combined effect that the efficiency factor and the level of social costs
produce in the private firm cash flows trigger and in the government cash flows trigger, re-
spectively. Assuming that γ = 0.2 and s= 0.02, the effect produced by the level of social costs
in moving the government cash flows trigger downwards is stronger than the effect caused by
the efficiency factor in placing the private firm cash flows trigger more below. This greater
difference between the two triggers results in higher values for c∗, since the effect produced
by the legal penalty needs to be stronger in order to move the private firm cash flows trigger
downwards and perfectly meet the government cash flows trigger.20
4.4 The Effects, to the Government, of a Including a Non-Optimal Value for the
Legal Penalty in the Contract
The model we have described proposes a method to determine the optimal level for the con-
tractual penalty, from the government or other public entity perspective. Based on its own
20We determined the government cash flows triggers and the private firm cash flows triggers, first not consid-
ering the effect caused by the level of the efficiency factor and, secondly not considering the effect caused by
the level of social costs. The difference between the two cash flows triggers is greater in the first case, which
demonstrates that the effect produced by the level of social costs is stronger, for these combinations of standard
deviations.
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estimates about the facility construction costs and the value of cash flows to be generated
from running the subsequent operations, and estimating the level of social costs and the com-
parative efficiency factor, the government is able to reach the value for the optimal contractual
penalty “per unit” of the private firm’s expected construction costs. This optimal contractual
penalty moves the private firm cash flows trigger downwards to perfectly meet the govern-
ment cash flows trigger and, thus, the two cash flows triggers have the same value. However,
since we are assuming the government construction costs to be stochastic, one may legiti-
mately ask which value for these costs should the government consider for the purpose of
determining the optimal penalty to be included in the contract form, in the day the optimal
contractual penalty needs to be determined. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
definition of the contractual penalty by the government and the bidding process occur in the
same moment of time. Therefore, and since any rational agent makes decisions based on
the best available information he or she has in the specific moment the decisions need to be
taken, it is reasonable to conclude that the estimated value for the construction costs the gov-
ernment has computed in that same moment will be the value the government should use for
the purpose of determining the optimal contractual penalty. However, since the government
construction costs behave stochastically, their value might be different the day after the day
the value for the contractual penalty was determined. If this occurs, the value of the legal
penalty determined and included in the contract form the day before will no longer be op-
timal. However, since the government needs to make a decision, the optimal value for the
contractual penalty, on that day, is determined by the government, based on the expected con-
struction costs estimated on that same day, and included in the contract form. Bidders prepare
their proposals taking into account the presence of this contractual penalty and establish their
bid prices accordingly. One of the bidders is selected and invited to sign the contract and,
consequently, to invest in executing the project facility and run the subsequent operations.
Yet, one may consider that the value of the legal penalty included in the contract form is not
optimal - not only due to the fact the government construction costs behave stochastically,
as we just mentioned - but also because the government might have inaccurately estimated
the selected bidder’s comparative efficiency. In fact, it is possible that the government has
determined the value of the contractual penalty assuming a comparative efficiency factor
which is different from the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency. Being so, we should
examine the effects that overestimating or underestimating the efficiency factor will produce,
from the government’s perspective. For this purpose, we need to present the value of the
selected bidder investment opportunity.
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Let FB(VB,KB) denote the value of the selected bidder option to invest in a project where a
legal penalty will be enforced in the case the selected firm does not implement the project im-
mediately. VB designates the present value of the cash flows the selected bidder will generate
by running the operations and KB designates the selected bidder facility construction costs.
Considering the same assumptions we have considered when we derived FP(VP,KP), i.e.,
the government expectation about the private firm decision to invest, and applying the same
procedures, we reach the boundary that separates the selected bidder’s waiting and investing
regions.21
Let c′ denote the value of the contractual penalty effectively included in the contract. Being
so, the value of the selected bidder investment opportunity is given as follows:
FB(VB,KB) =
(V ∗B −K∗B+ c
′
r )
(
VB
V ∗B
)β+ (
KB
K∗B
)η−− c′r ; i f {KB,VB}< {K∗B,V ∗B}
VB−KB ; i f {KB,VB} ≥ {K∗B,V ∗B}
(4.25)
We will discuss each of the two non-optimal scenarios separately. First, we present the sce-
nario where the government overestimated the selected bidder comparative efficiency and,
later, the scenario where the selected bidder efficiency factor is greater than the government
expected. Again, since the efficiency factor plays a crucial role in determining the opti-
mal value for the legal penalty, any difference that may exist between the efficiency factor
estimated by the government and the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency will nec-
essarily mean that the value of the legal penalty included in the contract is not optimal. As
we will demonstrate, overestimating (underestimating) the selected bidder comparative effi-
ciency factor will lead to the inclusion of a below-optimal (above-optimal) value for the legal
penalty in the contract form.
4.4.1 The Effects of Including a Below-Optimal Penalty Value in the Contract
Figure 4.3 illustrates the effects of overestimating the selected bidder comparative efficiency.
We assume that the government estimated the selected bidder comparative efficiency as being
γ = 0.2, and we will consider that the selected bidder comparative efficiency is, in fact,
γ = 0.1. We will also consider that the project dimension is given by K∗G = 200. Figure 4.3
21Please refer to Appendix A for further details.
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shows the effects caused by overestimating the selected bidder comparative efficiency and
the corresponding impact on the optimal contractual penalty.
Figure 4.3: the impact of overestimating the comparative efficiency on the optimal contractual
penalty
In Figure 4.3, point A2 has the coordinates that correspond to the selected bidder pair of
triggers before considering the effect of the contractual penalty, assuming the efficiency fac-
tor estimated by the government, i.e, {K+B ;V+B } = {160;329}, whereas point B2 graphically
represents the selected bidder pair of triggers, {K∗B;V ∗B} = {160;247} after considering the
impact of the legal penalty enforced in the contract, c2 = 1.9222. In these circumstances,
the government would expect the value of legal penalty included in the contract form, c2
to be sufficiently strong in moving the selected bidder cash flows trigger downwards, from
V+B = 329 to V
∗
B = 247 and, thus, perfectly meet the government cash flows trigger, V
∗
G = 247.
By overestimating the efficiency factor, the government has not succeeded in reaching this
purpose. The government was expecting the selected bidder to trigger the investment in
{K∗B;V ∗B} = {160;247}, represented by point B2, as the result of enforcing the contractual
penalty, c2 = 1.9222. If no penalty was enforced, and given the selected bidder’s real com-
parative efficiency, he or she would trigger the investment in point A
′
2 , whose coordinates
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are {K+B ;V+B } = {180;370}. By enforcing the contractual penalty c2 = 1.9222, when the
selected bidder comparative efficiency is γ = 0.1, the government is leading the selected bid-
der to trigger the investment in point B’2, whose coordinates are {K∗B;V ∗B} = {180;288}. In
fact, the selected bidder construction costs trigger, considering his or her real comparative
efficiency, is K∗B = 180, and the corresponding cash flows trigger is V ∗B = 288.22 Thus, by
imposing the contractual penalty, c2 = 1.9222, the government has led the selected bidder
cash flows trigger to move from V+B = 370 to V
∗
B = 288. Hence, the government’s purpose
of moving the selected firm cash flows trigger downwards to perfectly meet the government
cash flows trigger has not been accomplished, because the selected bidder cash flows trig-
ger is higher than the government cash flows trigger. This means that a greater penalty value
should be enforced in order to move further downwards the selected bidder cash flows trigger.
In Figure 4.3, the optimal contractual penalty is given by c∗2 and is clearly visible that the line
segment that reflects the impact of the optimal contractual penalty, c∗2 is bigger than the line
segment that reflects the impact caused by the value of the legal penalty actually included
in the contract, c2 = 1.9222. This fact graphically illustrates that overestimating the com-
parative efficiency factor leads to the definition of a below-optimal value for the contractual
penalty.
Table 4.8 includes a set of representative values aiming to demonstrate the effects, to govern-
ment, of including a below-optimal contractual penalty in the contract form. We assume that
the project dimension is given by K∗G = 200 and we also consider that the pair of observed
values in the market, at time t, for the selected bidder construction costs and the correspond-
ing cash flows is {KBt ;VBt} = {220;180}. We are therefore considering the case where, at
time t, the selected bidder decision to invest is situated in the waiting region.
Table 4.8: the effects, to the government, of overestimating the comparative efficiency
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05; s = 0.02)
c2 V ∗G K
+
B V
+
B K
∗
B V
∗
B KBt VBt FBt (VBt ,KBt )
γ = 0.1 1.9222 247 180 370 180 288 220 180 45.30
γ = 0.2 1.9222 247 160 329 160 247 220 180 44.72
22For a given value of the selected bidder construction costs trigger, the corresponding cash flows trigger
is determined using a system of simultaneous equations similar to the one composed by equations (4.20),
(4.21) and (4.22), i.e., the ones we used to derive the government expectation about the private firm investment
opportunity. Please refer to Appendix A for further details.
97
We have concluded that the government should have defined a greater value for the contrac-
tual penalty than the one actually enforced in the contract. The optimal contractual penalty
is c∗2 = 2.9087: this is the value for the legal penalty that moves the selected bidder cash
flows trigger, V+B = 370 downwards to perfectly meet the government cash flows trigger,
V ∗G = 247. The optimal contractual penalty, c
∗ = 2.9087 assumes a greater value than the one
included in the contract, i.e., c2 = 1.9222. Hence, overestimating the comparative efficiency
factor results in the definition of a below-optimal level for the contractual penalty, leading
the selected bidder cash flows trigger to be placed above the government cash flows trigger.
In fact, assuming K∗G = 200, the selected bidder construction costs trigger is K
∗
B = 180 for
γ = 0.1 and its cash flows trigger, V ∗B = 288, considering the value of the penalty included
in the contract form, c2 = 1.9222. Since the selected bidder will have a higher cash flows
trigger than the government predicted, the value of social costs will be greater than the value
the government considers to be acceptable, which means that the population will have to bear
a higher value of social costs. Yet, the fact that the contractual penalty is below its optimal
level results in a more valuable option to invest for the selected bidder “vis-a-vis” with the
scenario where the contractual penalty written down in the contract is optimal. The informa-
tion included in Table 4.8 confirms such. Assuming that the pair of observed values, at time t,
{KBt ;VBt}= {220;180}, the value of the selected bidder investment opportunity, FB(KB,VB),
at time t equals 45.30, whereas FB(KB,VB), at time t, in the scenario where the legal penalty
written down in the contract is optimal, equals 44.72. This numerically demonstrates that the
value of the option to invest is more valuable in the presence of a below-optimal contractual
penalty. Since we believe that rational bidders will offer higher prices as a direct result of
holding a more valuable option to invest, the government would therefore receive a higher
price. However, the increase in the expected value of social costs that results from delaying
the project implementation is not compensated by the extra-income the government would
most likely receive. In fact, the government would prefer to receive a lower price and ensure
that the value of of social costs considered to be tolerable is not exceeded. Hence, the sce-
nario where a below-optimal contractual penalty value is considered will produce effects that
the government would prefer to prevent.
4.4.2 The Effects of Including an Above-Optimal Penalty Value in the Contract
Figure 4.4 illustrates the impact of underestimating the selected bidder comparative efficiency
on the optimal contractual penalty. We assume, in this scenario, that the selected bidder
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comparative efficiency is, in fact, γ = 0.3. As in the previous scenario, we consider that the
project dimension is given by K∗G = 200.
Figure 4.4: the impact of underestimating the comparative efficiency on the optimal contrac-
tual penalty
In Figure 4.4 above, the point A2, with coordinates {K+B ;V+B } = {160;329}, represents the
selected bidder pair of triggers before considering the effect of the contractual penalty and as-
suming the efficiency factor estimated by the government (γ = 0.2). The coordinates of point
B2 represent the selected bidder pair of triggers, {K∗B;V ∗B}= {160;247}, after considering the
impact of the legal penalty included in the contract, c2 = 1.9222. By including this penalty
value in the contract, the government expected the contractual penalty c2 = 1.9222 to be
strong enough in moving the selected bidder cash flows trigger downwards, from V+B = 329
to V ∗B = 247 and, thus, to perfectly meet the government cash flows trigger, V ∗G = 247. So,
the government expected the selected bidder to trigger the investment in point B2, with coor-
dinates {K∗B;V ∗B} = {160;247}. However, since we are considering that the government has
underestimated the selected bidder efficiency factor - which is γ = 0.3 and not γ = 0.2 - then
the selected bidder construction costs trigger is K∗B = 140 and his or her corresponding cash
flows trigger, V ∗B = 206. This pair of triggers is represented in Figure 4.4 by point B
′
2, with
99
coordinates {K∗B;V ∗B}= {140;206}. In Figure 4.4, is visible that the value of the legal penalty
enforced in the contract, c2 is too high: the impact in moving the selected bidder cash flows
trigger from V+B = 329 to V
∗
G = 247 was too strong and shifted the trigger further downwards
to V ∗B = 206. We thus conclude that the optimal value for the contractual penalty would have
to be smaller in order to perfectly align the two cash flows triggers. For this purpose to be
accomplished, the optimal value for the contractual penalty would have to be c∗2 = 0.9523, a
lower value than the one actually included in the contract, c2 = 1.9222.
Table 4.9 includes a set of representative values aiming to demonstrate the effects, to gov-
ernment, of including an above-optimal contractual penalty in the contract form. As in the
previous scenario, we consider that the project dimension is given by K∗G = 200 and also that
the pair of observed values in the market, at time t for the selected bidder construction costs
and cash flows is {KBt ;VBt} = {220;180}, which means that the selected bidder decision to
invest, at time t, is situated in the waiting region.
Table 4.9: the effects, to the government, of underestimating the comparative efficiency
(for: σVG = σVP = 0.15; σKG = σKP = 0.10; δVG = δVP = 0.03; δKG = δKP = 0.03; ρG = ρP = 0; r = 0.05; s = 0.02)
c2 V ∗G K
+
B V
+
B K
∗
B V
∗
B KBt VBt FBt (VBt ,KBt )
γ = 0.2 1.9222 247 160 329 160 247 220 180 44.72
γ = 0.3 1.9222 247 140 288 140 206 220 180 43.42
Since the selected bidder is more efficient than the government predicted (in our example, the
selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency is γ = 0.3), we concluded that the government
should have defined a contractual penalty, c∗2 = 0.9523, thus smaller than the one actually
enforced in the contract, c2 = 1.9222. Consequently, the selected bidder cash flows trigger
assumes a lower value, V ∗B = 206, leading to a reduction in the level of social costs. We
recognize that a reduction in the value of social costs results in a benefit for the population
and argue that the government will welcome any benefit for the population that may rise,
provided that such benefit does not entail a cost.23 However, this benefit for the population
involves a cost to the government. Since the penalty value included in the contract form is
lower than the optimal value, we expect bidders to act rationally and offer a lower bid price
to the government as a consequence of holding a less valuable investment opportunity, when
23This is exactly the case where the comparative efficiency factor is strong enough to place the selected bidder
cash flows trigger below the government cash flows trigger, without the need of imposing a contractual penalty.
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compared with the case where the value of the legal penalty included in the contract form
is optimal. In fact, the selected bidder option to invest, at time t, FBt (VBt ,KBt ) equals 43.42,
whereas the value of the same option in the case the government has estimated correctly the
comparative efficiency is, at time t, equal to 44.72. We recognize that one might consider that
the decrease in the bid price the selected bidder will probably offer actually compensates the
benefit that derives from the reduction in the value of social costs. However, we argue that the
government will prefer to tolerate a higher value of social costs until the value determined has
being acceptable in the first place and, thus, not expose itself to the possibility of receiving
a lower bid price than the one the government would receive if the value of the contractual
penalty was, in fact, optimal.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
The suggested model is based on a contractual framework, in the context of a BOT project,
where the government or other public entity grants leeway to the selected bidder regarding
the timing for project implementation. However, this flexibility may entail a cost since a
contractual penalty is enforced in the event the selected firm does not implement the project
immediately. Aiming to determine the optimal value for this contractual penalty, we applied
a two-factor uncertainty approach where both the facility construction costs and the present
value of cash flows to be generated by subsequent operations follow geometric Brownian
motions that are possibly correlated.
We have assumed that the government is less efficient than the private firm in constructing
the project facility and we have also considered the existence of social costs, i.e., the costs
that correspond to the loss of social welfare occurring from the moment the project should
have been implemented and services being provided to the users and the moment the project
is actually completed.
In order to determine the optimal level for the contractual penalty, we derived both the gov-
ernment decision to invest and the government expectation about the private firm decision
to invest. As the latter does not support homogeneity of degree one in the corresponding
boundary conditions, due to the inclusion of the legal penalty in the value of the investment
opportunity, we followed Adkins and Paxson (2011) approach and constructed a set of three
simultaneous equations, which enabled us to define the private firm discriminatory boundary,
i.e., the boundary that separates the private firm’s waiting region from the private firm’s in-
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vesting region. We then applied again the same system of equations and reached the optimal
value for the contractual penalty “per unit” of cost, since proportionality is present between
the optimal value for the contractual penalty and the expected amount of construction costs.
Sensitivity analysis performed demonstrated that the greater the level of social costs the
sooner one expects the government would invest, since the consideration of higher levels
of social costs result in lower values for the government cash flows trigger. The analysis also
revealed that there is a level for the comparative efficiency above which there is no need to
include a penalty in the contract because such level of comparative efficiency - for the level
of social costs considered - naturally moves the private firm cash flows trigger downwards to
perfectly meet the government cash flows trigger. Similarly, there is a level of social costs
below which imposing a contractual penalty is not justifiable, for a given level of compar-
ative efficiency. Sensitivity analysis also led us to conclude that changes in the correlation
coefficients have a strong expected impact on the optimal contractual penalty. As both coef-
ficients assume greater values, the value of the optimal penalty decreases since one expects
stronger correlations to lead to lower cash flows triggers, both for the government and the
private firm. We also assessed the impact of variations in both standard deviations on the op-
timal contractual penalty. The results demonstrate that higher volatility levels result in higher
values for both the government cash flows trigger and the private firm cash flows trigger, as
expected. However, the difference between the private firm cash flows trigger before consid-
ering the effect of the contractual penalty and the government cash flows trigger is greater as
the volatility levels increase. This increasing difference between the two cash flows triggers
is explained by the combined effect that the efficiency factor and the level of social costs
produce in the private firm cash flows trigger and in the government cash flows trigger, re-
spectively. Indeed, the effect produced by the level of social costs in moving the government
cash flows trigger downwards is stronger than the effect produced by the efficiency factor in
placing the private firm cash flows trigger more below. This greater difference between the
two triggers results in the definition of higher optimal contractual penalty values.
Finally, we examined the effects that overestimating or underestimating the comparative ef-
ficiency factor produces in the value of the optimal contractual penalty. We concluded that
overestimating the efficiency factor results in the definition of a below-optimal value for the
contractual penalty, and that underestimating this same factor will lead to the inclusion of
an-above optimal value for the legal penalty in the contract form. Being so, since overes-
timating (underestimating) the value for the comparative efficiency factor will result in the
inclusion of a below-optimal (above-optimal) value for the legal penalty in the contract form,
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then the selected bidder cash flows trigger will be greater (smaller) than the government cash
flows trigger. Since we defined the optimal contractual penalty as the one that ensures that
the selected firm has the same value for his or her cash flows trigger than the government
would have if the government decided to undertake the project, we then concluded that the
government’s purpose will never be accomplished if the comparative efficiency factor is not
estimated with full accuracy.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Three theoretical models were proposed in this dissertation. The first two models, presented
in Chapters II and III, are support decision models intended to be used by managers of con-
struction companies whose business consists in performing construction projects awarded
through adequate bidding competitions. The third model, suggested in Chapter IV, is intended
to be applied by governments or other public entities in the context of Build-Own-Transfer
(BOT) projects.
The model presented in Chapter II aims to contribute to the optimal mark-up bid debate using
the real options approach. The option to sign the contract and perform the project constitutes
a real option since construction costs behave stochastically from the moment the bid price
is established and the moment the client selects one of the bidders and, also, because the
selected bidder has flexibility regarding the decision of whether to sign the contract and, con-
sequently, invest in executing the project. The numerical solution we suggested, consisting
of a maximization problem, determines that to the highest value of the option to sign the
contract weighted by the probability of winning the bid, corresponds a specific price and,
therefore, a specific mark-up bid. Considering the characteristics of the real option we have
identified, this price is the optimal price and, hence, the price construction managers should
include in their bid proposals.
Sensitivity analysis performed to the option volatility level and the option ’time to expiration’
parameter revealed that the maximum value of the option is higher when greater levels both
for the volatility and the ’time to expiration’ parameters are considered. However, to this
higher maximum option value corresponds a lower optimal bid price since construction man-
agers will include a lower mark-up bid as a consequence of holding a more valuable option
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to invest. A sensitivity analysis was also performed to the project dimension, given by the
expected value of construction costs. Results demonstrated that no scale-effect is present in
the model since the consideration of greater construction costs values produces no impact on
the optimal mark-up bid.
Sensitivity analysis was also performed to the two parameters included in the proposed win-
ning function. The results clearly showed that the model’s outcome is highly sensitive to
variations in both them. However, the optimal bid price is particularly sensitive to varia-
tions in parameter ’n’ (the one responsible for shaping the winning function’s concavity and
convexity) when this parameter assumes very low levels. Therefore, construction managers
should be aware that variations in this parameter when very low levels are considered will
produce a strong impact on the optimal bid price.
An extension to the model was also proposed in order to accommodate the existence of
penalty costs, borne by the selected bidder in the event he or she declines the invitation to
sign the contract. The numerical solution was adapted with the purpose of considering these
type of costs and, according to the inputs considered in the numerical example, the optimal
price is greater when penalty costs are present. Based on the same inputs, we also concluded
that the higher the level of penalty costs the higher the optimal price.
The model suggested in Chapter III addressed the impact that volume uncertainty may pro-
duce on the project value and on the optimal bid price. This type of uncertainty assumes a
critical importance since, frequently, construction managers do not know, at the bid prepa-
ration stage, the exact amount of work that will be performed during the project’s life cycle
and, hence, the expected final profit the project will generate. To assess the impact of volume
uncertainty on the project value, we defined a discrete-time stochastic variable and designated
it as “additional value”. Additional value is the value that is hidden in the the most uncertain
portions of the project and is defined as the one that does not result from solely performing
the tasks specified in the initial contract.
To capture and quantify this hidden-value, construction companies need to invest. Initially,
by merely using the skills of his or her own experienced staff, managers are able to define
a high-value estimate and a low-value estimate for the additional profit and to stipulate a
probability of occurrence to each of the estimates. Applying the maximization procedure
suggested in Chapter II, we concluded that managers will produce a more competitive bid
price even if no incremental investment is undertaken, provided that some hidden-value is
captured and quantified during the bid preparation stage. However, in order to resolve the un-
certainty concerning which of the two estimates will become the true value for the expected
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additional profit, contractors often need to invest in human capital and technology and, thus,
hire specialized firms and skilled consultants. The model’s outcome is the threshold value for
this incremental investment in human capital and technology. A decision rule was reached:
managers should hire external services with the purpose of resolving the uncertainty regard-
ing which of the two estimates previously defined is the true value, as long as the cost of this
incremental investment in human capital and technology does not exceed the predetermined
threshold value. Hence, we concluded that any amount spent in hiring external services,
which is lower than the threshold value, will lead to an increase in the value of the project.
On the contrary, if the amount invested is greater than the predetermined threshold value,
then the project value will decrease.
The model also enables managers to establish the optimal bidding price if (i) no incremental
investment is undertaken; (ii) if the incremental investment in human capital and technology
reveals that the true value for the additional profit equals the high-estimate and (iii) if this
investment reveals that the true value for the additional profit equals the low-estimate.
Sensitivity analysis showed that the incremental investment threshold value responds linearly
to variations in the project dimension, which means that no scale-effect is present. Sensitivity
analysis also showed that, the closer to 50% is the probability of occurrence associated with
the estimates, the greater the threshold value is, since undertaking the incremental investment
assumes a higher importance in response to the presence of higher levels of uncertainty re-
garding which of the two estimates will become the true value. Finally, sensitivity analysis
performed to the difference between the two estimates revealed that, the greater the difference
between the two estimates defined for the additional value, the greater the level of uncertainty
regarding which of the two estimates will become the true value. Therefore, the incremental
investment assumes a greater importance in resolving this uncertainty and this greater impor-
tance is reflected in a greater incremental investment threshold value. On the contrary, if the
difference between the estimates is smaller, the level of uncertainty is lower, which means
that the incremental investment assumes a lower importance in eliminating this uncertainty
and, hence, the threshold for the incremental investment assumes a smaller value.
In Chapter IV, we turned our attention to BOT projects and suggested a model, based on
a contractual framework where the government or other public entity does not impose any
obligation regarding the timing for project implementation. However, the presence of this
flexibility may entail a cost to the selected bidder since a contractual penalty is enforced in
the case he or she does not initiate the project immediately. In order to determine the optimal
value for the contractual penalty, we applied a two-factor uncertainty approach where both
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the facility construction costs and the present value of cash flows to be generated by running
the subsequent activities follow geometric Brownian motions that are possibly correlated.
We have assumed that the government is less efficient than the private firm in executing
the project facility and have also considered the existence of social costs, i.e., the costs that
correspond to the loss of social welfare occurring from the moment the project should have
been implemented and services provided to the users and the moment the project is actually
completed.
In order to determine the optimal level for the contractual penalty, we derived both the gov-
ernment decision to invest and the government expectation about the private firm decision
to invest. As the latter does not support homogeneity of degree one in the corresponding
boundary conditions, due to the inclusion of the legal penalty in the value of the option to
invest, we followed Adkins and Paxson (2011) quasi-analytical approach and defined a set of
three simultaneous equations. This set of equations enabled us to determine the private firm
discriminatory boundary, separating the private firm’s waiting and investing regions and to
reach the optimal level for the contractual penalty. Moreover, since proportionality is present
between the optimal contractual penalty value, in absolute terms, and the private firm ex-
pected construction costs, we determined the optimal value for the contractual penalty “per
unit” of the private firm expected construction costs.
Sensitivity analysis performed demonstrated that the greater the level of social costs the
sooner one expects the government to invest. In fact, the consideration of higher levels of
social costs result in lower values for the government cash flows trigger. Sensitivity analysis
also showed that there is a level for the comparative efficiency above which there is no need
to include a penalty in the contract because such level of comparative efficiency, for a given
level of social costs, naturally shifts the private firm cash flows trigger downwards to per-
fectly meet the government cash flows trigger. In similar terms, a level of social costs does
exist above which imposing a contractual penalty becomes necessary, for a given level of
comparative efficiency. We then presented the analytical solution that determines these two
threshold values.
Sensitivity analysis also revealed that variations in both correlation coefficients have a strong
expected impact on the optimal contractual penalty. We also examined the impact produced
by variations in both standard deviations on the optimal contractual penalty. We concluded
that the consideration of higher volatility levels result in higher cash flows trigger values
both for the government and the private firm. Moreover, we concluded that, as the level
of volatility increases, the difference between the private firm cash flows trigger and the
107
government cash flows trigger becomes greater. This fact is explained by the stronger impact
produced by the level of social costs in the government cash flows trigger when compared
with the impact produced by the comparative efficiency factor in the private firm cash flows
trigger. Consequently, higher contractual penalties are needed to align the two cash flows
triggers.
Finally, we studied the effects that overestimating or underestimating the comparative effi-
ciency factor produces in the optimal contractual penalty. We concluded that overestimating
(underestimating) the efficiency factor results in the definition of a below-optimal (above-
optimal) value for the contractual penalty. Being so, since overestimating (underestimating)
the value for the comparative efficiency factor will lead to the inclusion of a below-optimal
(above-optimal) value for the legal penalty in the contract form, then the selected bidder cash
flows trigger will be higher (lower) than the government cash flows trigger. Since the optimal
contractual penalty is the one that ensures that the selected firm has the same value for his
or her cash flows trigger the government would have if the government decided to undertake
the project, we concluded that the government’s purpose will never be accomplished if the
comparative efficiency factor is not estimated with full precision.
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Appendix A
The Selected Bidder Decision to Invest
Let FB(KB,VB) denote the value of the selected bidder investment opportunity, where KB
designates the facility construction costs and VB the value of the cash flows to be generated
by operating the subsequent activities. Both stochastic variables follow geometric Brownian
motions that are possibly correlated:
dVB = αVBVBdt+σVBVBdzVB (A.1)
dKB = αKBKBdt+σKBKBdzKB (A.2)
E(dzVB,dzKB) = ρBdt (A.3)
where αVB and αKB are the drift parameters, dt is the time interval, σVB and σKB the stan-
dard deviations for each of the variables, dzVB and dzKB the increments of standard Wiener
processes for VB and KB and ρB is the correlation coefficient between VB and KB.
Under risk-neutrality, FB(VB,KB) must satisfy the following partial differential equation:
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where r is the risk-free interest rate, c′ is the value of the legal penalty enforced in the contract,
δVB and δKB are the rates of return-shortfall for VB and KB, respectively. δVB and δKB are given
by the following equations:
δVB = r−αVB (A.5)
δKB = r−αKB (A.6)
The partial differential equation (A.4) has a non-homogeneous part, c′, being the rest of the
equation homogeneous. The general solution for the homogeneous part of the partial equation
, FHB (VB,KB) is given by:
FHB (VB,KB) = A9V
β+
B K
η+
B +A10V
β+
B K
η−
B +A11V
β−
B K
η+
B +A12V
β−
B K
η−
B (A.7)
where A9, A10, A11 and A12 are constants that need to be determined. β+, β−, η+ and η− are
the four roots of an elliptical equation, which is the two-factor equivalent of the one-factor
stochastic model quadratic equation presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The elliptical
equation is as follows:
Q(β ,η) =
1
2
σ2VBβ (β −1)+
1
2
σ2KBη(η−1)+
ρBσVBσKBβη+(r−δVB)β +(r−δKB)η− r = 0 (A.8)
The function Q(β ,η) = 0 defines an ellipse.1 Equation (A.8) has four quadrants, to which
of them corresponds a pair of the four roots we mentioned, i.e., the four points where the
1Please refer to Adkins and Paxson (2011) for further details.
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elliptic function meets the axes. If we consider the absorbing barriers FB(0,0), FB(0,KB),
then A3 = A4 = 0. This condition holds because the option to invest is worthless if the present
value of the future cash flows to be generated is zero. Likewise, for FB(VB,KB), and as KB
becomes infinitely large for any value of VB, the option is also worthless. To respect this
condition, we need to set constant A1 = 0, leaving only constant A2 6= 0. Consequently, in our
case the quadrant of interest is the second one - the one that corresponds to the pair of roots
{β+,η−}. Thus, the general solution for the homogeneous part of the partial differential
equation presented above, FHB (VB,KB) is reduced and takes the following form:
FHB (VB,KB) = A10V
β+
B K
η−
B (A.9)
The particular solution for the non-homogeneous part of the partial differential equation, FNHB
is given by the following equation:
FNHB = −
c′
r
(A.10)
Joining the homogeneous and non-homogeneous solutions, we obtain the following expres-
sion, which satisfies the whole partial differential equation (A.4):
FHB (VB,KB)+F
NH
B = FB(VB,KB) = A10V
β+
B K
η−
B −
c′
r
(A.11)
The value matching condition implies that, when the trigger values for both VB and KB are
simultaneously attained, the value of the option to invest, FB(V ∗B ,K∗B) must equal the project’s
expected NPV. Therefore:
FB(V ∗B ,K
∗
B) = A10V
∗β+
B K
∗η−
B −
c′
r
=V ∗B −K∗B (A.12)
Since this value-matching condition does not support homogeneity of degree one on both
sides of the equation (which means that β++ η− 6=1), we follow Adkins and Paxson (2011)
approach and construct a set of three simultaneous equations. The first is the elliptical equa-
tion (A.8) and the other two equations are the two smooth-pasting conditions derived from
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the value-matching condition given by equation (A.12).
The first smooth-pasting condition is the first-order derivative of the value-matching condi-
tion given by equation (A.12), in respect to V ∗B . After some rearrangements, we reach the
expression for the first smooth-pasting condition, given by equation (A.13).
β+(V ∗B −K∗B+
c′
r
) = V ∗B (A.13)
The second smooth-pasting condition is the first-order derivative of the same value matching
condition, in respect to K∗B. Likewise, after some rearrangements, we obtain the second
smooth-pasting condition, given by equation (A.14).
η−(V ∗B −K∗B+
c′
r
) = −K∗B (A.14)
Thus, the set of three simultaneous equations is formed by equations (A.8), (A.13) and
(A.14). We need to set K∗B since we are in the presence of four unknowns (K∗B,V ∗B ,β+,η−)
and only have three equations available. Being so, we need to fix K∗B and solve the system
of equations considering the value of the legal penalty included in the contract form, c′. By
repeating this process, we determine the corresponding values for V ∗B and, hence, reach the
discriminatory boundary that separates the investing region from the waiting region, com-
posed by a set of pairs {K∗B;V ∗B}.
Considering that the selected bidder investment opportunity is situated in the waiting re-
gion, the investment will be triggered when K∗B and V ∗B are simultaneously attained, i.e.,
{KB,VB} ≥ {K∗B,V ∗B}. When both triggers are simultaneously attained, the value of the op-
tion to invest equals the project’s expected NPV. Otherwise, the selected bidder should wait
and defer the investment. Hence, the value of the selected bidder investment opportunity is
given as follows:
FB(VB,KB) =
(V ∗B −K∗B+ c
′
r )
(
VB
V ∗B
)β+ (
KB
K∗B
)η−− c′r ; i f {KB,VB}< {K∗B,V ∗B}
VB−KB ; i f {KB,VB} ≥ {K∗B,V ∗B}
(A.15)
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Figure A.1 shows the selected bidder discriminatory boundary, assuming that the value of
the legal penalty actually included in the contract is c′ = 1.9222. We set K∗B ranging from 80
to 480 and consider that: σVB = 0.15, σKB = 0.10, ρB = 0, r = 0.05, δBV = δBK = 0.03 and
γ = 0.2.
Figure A.1: the selected bidder discriminatory boundary
The discriminatory boundary included in Figure A.1 was determined assuming that the value
of the contractual penalty, c′ is the same, regardless of the amount considered for the selected
bidder construction costs trigger. The discriminatory boundary is not a straight line due to
the effect of the contractual penalty, c′ > 0 in the system of simultaneous equations used to
determine the set of pairs {K∗B;V ∗B}.
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